American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Scholarship & Research

2008

Immigrant Remittances
Ezra Rosser
American University Washington College of Law, erosser@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Rosser, Ezra. “Immigrant Remittances.” Connecticut Law Review 41 (2008): 1-62.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 41

NOVEMBER 2008

NUMBER 1

Article
Immigrant Remittances
EZRA ROSSER
Remittances, the sending of money from immigrants back to their home
countries, are the newest anti-poverty, development activity of the poor to
be applauded by international institutions and economists. Exceeding
foreign aid and private investment to many developing countries,
remittances are being hailed as a new, untapped resource with powerful
poverty alleviation and potential development attributes. After presenting
the poverty, developmental, and economic characteristics of this new
transnational connection between immigrants and their loved ones, as well
as the dangerous effects of excessive remittance regulation, this Article
argues that remittances should be understood as an anti-poverty tool, but
not as a route to development.
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Immigrant Remittances
EZRA ROSSER ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The global poor can solve the problem of poverty. So long as the right
institutions are in place, poverty can be eradicated through development
insights from the third world. This is the message of three economic ideas
and activities—micro-lending, land-titling, and remittances—that have
captured the imagination of international institutions and policy makers.
These three economic phenomena share many attractive features, from
their bottom-up global origins to their reliance on capitalist mechanisms to
their ability to empower the poor, but driving their popularity in the West
is the selfish hope that global poverty can be dealt with costlessly.
This Article focuses on remittances—“the money that migrants send
home to their families”1—for their own sake and as a window on the
incorporation of economic ideas by Western societies (explored at the end
of this Article through law and development literature). Remittance
transfers globally exceeded $230 billion in 2005, perhaps by as much as
fifty percent if all informal remittances were counted.2 In some recipient

∗
Assistant Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks to Raquel
Aldana, Daniel Bradlow, Angela P. Harris, Heather Hughes, Kevin R. Johnson, Fernanda Nicola, Nina
Pillard, Alvaro Santos, Daniel Sokol, David Snyder, Jason Solomon and faculty participants at a
Georgetown University Law Center faculty workshop, the 2007 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools’ Annual Meeting, the 2007 annual summer legal conference at the University of Gloucester,
U.K., the 2007 Clasco-Crop Conference at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador, a seminar
presentation at the Universidad del Pacifico, Peru, the 2006 International Migration Conference at the
Universidad Centroamericana, El Salvador, and the 2007 Poverty Law Symposium at American
University Washington College of Law for helpful comments.
1
Paul Wolfowitz, Foreword to WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION, at vii (2006) [hereinafter WORLD BANK]. But see
José de Luna Martínez, Workers’ Remittances to Developing Countries: A Survey with Central Banks
on Selected Public Policy Issues 7, n.3 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3638, 2005)
(“There is no universally accepted definition of remittances.”). This Article focuses on a single
remittance type, worker remittances; other remittance types are beyond the scope of this Article.
2
MANUEL OROZCO ET AL., CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, CARD-BASED REMITTANCES: A
CLOSER LOOK AT SUPPLY AND DEMAND 3 (2007), available at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/
document/card_based_remittances.pdf. As the World Bank reports, “[r]emittances transferred through
informal operators or hand carried by travelers are unlikely to be captured in official statistics, although
they may represent a substantial addition to remittances sent through official channels.” WORLD
BANK, supra note 1, at 91; accord BIMAL GHOSH, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRANTS’
REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: MYTHS, RHETORIC, AND REALITIES 15 (2006), available at
http://www.antigone.gr/listpage/selected_publications/eu/071127.pdf (noting that actual remittances to
developing countries far exceed amount officially recorded).
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countries, remittances “can account for as much as a third of GDP.”3
Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean “exceed, by substantial
margins, such other flows [of capital] as portfolio investment, foreign aid,
and government and private borrowing.”4 These vast sums have elevated
remittances to near celebrity status in the last ten years.5 Leading
economists, international development organizations,6 and even the
popular press7 have all jumped on the remittance bandwagon. Yet the
crucial questions—whether to increase or decrease regulation, whether to
attempt to direct the use and benefits of remittances or remittance flows,
and whether remittances are a development tool—remain unanswered.
In this Article, I argue that remittance transaction barriers ought to be
lowered but that remittance sending and receiving countries should not
focus their “third world” development goals on this phenomenon. Though
the legal community has yet to expressly tackle remittances, existing
institutions and rules shape the scale and significance of remittance flows.
Though rarely forced to acknowledge the contradiction inherent in
3
COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE SERVICES 1 (2007), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss76.
pdf?noframes=1.
4
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, MAKING THE MOST OF FAMILY REMITTANCES: SECOND REPORT
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON REMITTANCES 3 (2007), available at
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/family_remittances.pdf.
5
As a World Bank report begins, “[a] booming interest in the topic of workers’ remittances has
developed over the past few years on the part of academics, donors, international financial institutions,
commercial banks, money transfer operators, microfinance institutions, and policy makers.” Guillermo
Perry, Foreword to PABLO FAJNZYLBER & J. HUMBERTO LÓPEZ, CLOSE TO HOME: THE DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT OF REMITTANCES IN LATIN AMERICA, at v (2007), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE/Resources/ClosetoHome.pdf [hereinafter CLOSE TO HOME]; see
also Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Dilip Ratha, Remittances: An Overview, in WORLD BANK,
REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 1, 3 (Samuel Munzele Maimbo &
Dilip Ratha eds., 2005) [hereinafter REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS]
(noting the “recent revival in interest in migrant remittances”); Susan Pozo, On Remittances and Risk,
in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: MAKING MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 71, 72 (Donald F. Terry &
Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005) (noting that “until recently, policymakers and researchers have paid little
attention to international remittances”). For overviews of remittance scholarship, see Eve Hamilton,
The State of Remittance Research: An Overview, in INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE CONFERENCE REPORT: RESEARCH ON REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN 10–18 (2007), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Conference
%20Report,%20Research%20on%20Remittances%20to%20LAC%20FINAL.pdf,
and
DOVELYN
RANNVEIG AGUNIAS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS,
IMPACTS, AND POLICY OPTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2006), available at http://www.
migrationpolicy.org/pubs/mig_dev_lit_review_091406.pdf.
6
For example, in the past two years “the flagship publications of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have all addressed the
growing importance of migration and remittances and their impact on development efforts.” CLOSE TO
HOME, supra note 5, at 1.
7
See, e.g., Rory Carroll, Emigrants from Latin America Sent Home £32bn Lifeline: Record Sum
Dwarfs Foreign Direct Investment and Aid, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 19, 2007, at 24; Jason
DeParle, A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50
(noting the attention now being directed at remittances); The Importance of Remittances, ECONOMIST,
July 31, 2004 (noting that in 2006 remittances “exceeded the combined flow of aid and foreign direct
investment” to Latin America).
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formally closed borders and look-the-other-way economic reliance upon
undocumented workers, remittances attest to both the porous nature of our
borders and the perpetually subordinate position of many remittancesending immigrants. Poor workers’ ability to care for loved ones with
money earned in developed countries creates families that transcend
national borders. Celebratory or permissive stances towards remittances
indict our immigration policy by drawing attention to the contrast between
officially closed borders when it comes to labor and open borders when it
comes to capital flow, even when earned by those thought of as “illegal
aliens.”
With remittances no longer relegated to the “errors and omissions
columns in international financial reports,”8 the rules that give shape to the
remittance phenomenon can be tweaked in a way that improves on their
power to reduce poverty in recipient countries. But, supporting and
exposing remittance benefits does not diminish the significance of the
challenges of a globalized market in a world of great inequality across
countries. As is true of microcredit and land-titling, remittances need to be
understood as an anti-poverty tool, not as a development tool.
Remittances, though perhaps buying time, do not excuse governments and
institutions in the developing or developed world from their shared
responsibility to meet the challenge of inadequate and unequal growth
dynamics. Remittances, albeit generated through personal sacrifice, can
alleviate some of the hardships families face because of a lack of local
opportunities in their home countries. Ultimately, while remittances are
“hot” in development circles, remittances are by their very nature better
suited to reducing poverty than fuelling lasting development.9
My argument proceeds in three stages. In Part II of this Article, I
present an in depth description of remittances in terms of their impact on
poverty, consumption, and national development. Such a detailed
description, though somewhat at odds with the broad theoretical structure
of typical law review articles, is a requisite for my later critique of
remittances as a development tool. Furthermore, given that this is the first
8
MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SENDING MONEY HOME:
LEVERAGING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF REMITTANCES 1 (2006), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.
org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=823579.
9
Recipient country awareness of the power of remittances preceded the current attention being
given remittances by international development organizations and sender countries. And given the
fickle nature of popular and intellectual attention, and the way discussion is disproportionately driven
by the gaze of developed countries, recipient countries will no doubt be dedicated to remittance issues
long after the current general remittance emphasis has dissipated.
Though development experts are paying attention, scholars in other areas of the law have not yet
focused on the phenomenon. Remittances should not be so relegated; rather, as Professor Lucy A.
Williams argues regarding anti-poverty advocates, an identifier I would self-embrace, there is a need to
explore connections between areas of law in order to “provide a fuller picture of legal structures that
perpetuate poverty.” Lucy Williams, Towards an Emerging International Poverty Law, in
INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW: AN EMERGING DISCOURSE 1, 12 (Lucy Williams ed., 2006).
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law review article on remittances, a fully descriptive presentation of
remittances is valuable in and of itself as an introduction of the
phenomenon to the legal community. Though remittances have been
important throughout human history and such transfers are a global
practice, Part II uses the recent remittance experience of Latin America
and, in particular, of one country, El Salvador, as a case study.10 In Part
III, I shift my focus to the regulatory and tax-based policy challenges that
threaten to hem in future remittance transfers. As such, Part III is part
description and part argument regarding the importance of low transactions
and regulatory costs. In Part IV, I critique the “institutionalization” of
remittances and remittance dialogue by Western institutions.
My
conclusion—that the love demonstrated by transnational families ought to
inform remittance and development policy—requires the injection of a
degree of realism regarding the role remittances play in recipient countries.
A sound international policy on remittances is one that does not use
paternalistic and instinctively critical observations regarding the downsides
of remittances to limit them, but instead requires that we stop thinking of
remittances as a phenomenon to be manipulated like other development
tools.
II. SCALE, IMPACT, AND ECONOMICS OF REMITTANCES
In the week before Christmas, paired lines—separated by vast
distances and national borders—form at money transfer companies and in
the offices of banks whose Spanish names reflect their Latin American
roots. Just north of Washington, D.C., along University Boulevard in
Silver Spring, Maryland and next to the “La Union Mall,” named for a
Salvadoran town in the heart of D.C.’s Salvadoran immigrant
community,11 hermanos lejanos (the Salvadoran name for Salvadoran
expatriates, literally “far away brother”) line up at Banco Cuscatlan to
transact the only sort of business possible at that branch: they send money
10
El Salvador is not a random choice; rather it is a country with a rich remittance experience.
Remittances represent a significant fraction of El Salvador’s GDP (see Part II.A) and many families in
the country rely upon remittances, making “the Salvadoran economy . . . highly dependent on
remittances.” Jessica Sabine et al., Remittances and Human Development: The Case of El Salvador 6
(Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Working Paper No. 2005/1) (emphasis omitted), available
at
http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/925MGSoGWorkingpaper2005-1.pdf;
accord
Congressional Research Services, Central America and the Dominican Republic in the Context of the
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States 35 (CRS Report No. RL32322, Oct. 24,
2005) available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57870.pdf.
Finally, the choice to focus on El Salvador is personal: I am married to a Salvadoran. I first
became interested in this topic when I realized that a vast gulf existed between Salvadoran knowledge
and experience with remittances and that of most Americans, even highly educated ones, who have
trouble even defining “remittances.”
11
For more on Washington, D.C.’s Salvadoran immigration, see Terry A. Repak, Labor
Recruitment and the Lure of the Capital: Central American Migrants in Washington, D.C., 8 GENDER
& SOC. 507 (1994) (focusing on gendered aspect of migration to D.C.).
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to their relatives living in El Salvador. Thousands of miles south, lines
extend to the sidewalk outside remittance dispersal locations; in Usulután,
El Salvador, people of all ages crowd into Western Union’s downtown
storefront, fighting their way to the counter to collect money sent only
hours before by their U.S.-based relatives.13 And while remittance activity
reaches a crescendo before Christmas and other holidays, such as Mother’s
Day,14 remittances play a significant role for hermanos lejanos, the family
members they support, and Latin American countries year round.
A. Remittance Growth and Scale
According to the president of the Inter-American Dialogue, “it is hard
to exaggerate” the importance of remittances on Latin America and the
Caribbean, and remittances are perhaps “Latin America’s most important
resource.”15 This significance is becoming recognized not simply because
the international glance has turned to them, but because the scale and
growth of remittances has made these “dynamic flows of money” stand
out.16 Latin America, and the Caribbean countries in particular, feel the
effects of remittances; they are “at the top of the ranking . . . of
remittances-receiving regions,” in the aggregate and on a per capita basis.17
U.S. Latino immigrants send “upwards of $50 billion a year” to their home
countries.18 This $50 billion reflects a tenfold increase in remittances to
Latin America in real terms over the last two decades.19 Extending the
12
Banco Cuscatlan is one of many options; Western Union is located in the same shopping center
and not far away there are other Salvadoran banks.
13
The crowd at the Western Union can disrupt traffic traveling along the Pan-American Highway
through Usulután.
14
See Krissah Williams, To Latina Mothers, With Love: A Refrigerator From America, WASH.
POST, May 10, 2007, at D1 (reporting that Mother’s Day—which occurs a few days prior to the U.S.
holiday—is “one of the biggest gift-giving holidays” for Latinos and that “Western Union says money
transfers are spiking”).
15
Peter Hakim, Preface to INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, ALL IN THE FAMILY: LATIN AMERICA’S
MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOW: REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
TASK FORCE ON REMITTANCES 1 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.iadialogue.org/publications/
country_studies/remittances/all_family.pdf.
16
OROZCO ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. But see Ester Hernandez & Susan Bibler Coutin, Remitting
Subjects: Migrants, Money and States, 35 ECON. AND SOC’Y 185, 189 (2006) (questioning the 1990s
reported remittance growth by asking “whether the amount of money transferred actually increased or
whether reforms simply permitted banks to record a larger percentage of these transactions”).
17
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 2; accord OROZCO ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (“The
relationship between Latin America and the U.S. constitutes the highest volume remittance market in
the world.”).
18
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 3. This paper focuses on South-North migration
and remittance flows, but it should be noted that remittances also are important in South-South
migration. For more on such remittances, see Dilip Ratha & William Shaw, South-South Migration
and Remittances (World Bank, Working Paper No. 102, 2007), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:2
1154867~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.
19
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 1. Given the split between documented, measured flows and
informal methods of sending remittances, it can be hard to separate the increase in counted remittance
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time frame expands the remittance increase multiplier to more than twenty
times the level of remittance sending to Latin America in 1980.20 The
growth in remittances to the region is replicated in El Salvador’s
impressively expanding remittance receipts, now accounting for fifteen to
eighteen percent of the country’s GDP.21 Officially counted remittances—
a count which does not include remittances sent through informal
channels—to El Salvador more than doubled from 1999 to 2007, with
remittances increasing from $1.4 billion to $3.7 billion.22
Driving the growth in the size of the U.S. remittance market to Latin
America is U.S. Latino population growth.23 “Immigrants in the U.S.
represent a large and growing market for financial institutions,”24 and “[a]s
the immigrant population has grown, the volume of remittances has
increased dramatically.”25 Latin American migrants in the United States
almost doubled between 1990 and 2000, from 8.6 million to about 16
million.26 The number of Salvadorans living in the United States by the
tail end of a nearly decade long civil war in El Salvador was 565,081 in
1990, but by 2004 had nearly tripled to 1,449,051.27 Latino in-migration is
increases into increases due to more money actually being sent and increases due to better measurement
of flows or the prior flows now entering formal channels. See Dilip Ratha, Leveraging Remittances for
Development, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. POL’Y BRIEF, June 2007, at 1–2, available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_062507.pdf (discussing the differences between the
measured amount of remittances and the true amount).
20
Pablo Acosta et al., Remittances and Development in Latin America, 29 WORLD ECON. 957,
958 (2006).
21
Given the undocumented nature of some remittance transfers, estimates of the GDP percentage
share of remittances naturally vary slightly depending on the study and source, but the fifteen to
eighteen percent share seems to be a standard accepted range. See Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik,
Self-Discovery in a Development Strategy for El Salvador, 6 ECONOMIA: J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN
ECON. ASS’N 43, 70 (Fall 2005) (fifteen percent of GDP on average from 2000 to 2004); CLOSE TO
HOME, supra note 5, at 4 (seventeen percent of GDP in 2004); INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra
note 4, at 5 (eighteen percent of GDP in 2005).
22
Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, http://www.bcr.gob.sv/estadisticas/se_remesas.html.
23
Though the discussion that follows emphasizes that more immigrants equals increased
remittances, the relationship between remittances and migration is not necessarily unidirectional;
remittances can help people “remain in their home country . . . discourag[ing] future immigration.” Eli
Coffino, Note, A Long Road to Residency: The Legal History of Salvadoran & Guatemalan
Immigration to the United States with a Focus on NACARA, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177, 206
(2006).
24
Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Banking on Remittances: Increasing Market Efficiencies for
Consumers and Financial Institutions 33 (July 11, 2005) (emphasis added) (paper presented at Federal
Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference: Promises and Pitfalls: As Consumer
Finance Options Multiply, Who is Being Served and at What Cost?, Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session3_hogarth.pdf.
25
Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (opening statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:86402.pdf.
26
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 10.
27
PROGRAMA DE NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, PNUD, EL SALVADOR, INFORME
SOBRE DESARROLLO HUMANO EL SALVADOR: UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS, EL IMPACTO DE
LAS MIGRACIONES ch. 2, figs. 2.1 & 2.2 (2005) [hereinafter UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS],
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part of the general global trend the World Bank observed of accelerated
migration to high-income countries, a trend that may even increase.28
“Pull” factors generated in developed countries have great explanatory
power regarding macro trends in migration levels.29 Additionally, societal
out-migration—fueled by a civil war,30 natural disasters,31 and limited
economic opportunities32—has helped create a Salvadoran transnational
community for which remittances are an important part of the relationship
between expatriates and their relatives back home in El Salvador.33
Moreover, the expansive growth of Salvadoran migration arguably reflects
the government of El Salvador’s role “in encouraging and managing the
flows of people and remittances.”34 Whether reflecting war, natural
disasters, relative economic opportunities, or simply over-population of the
country (El Salvador is the most densely populated country in Central
America),35 explosive migration to the United States has helped increase
the demand for, and use of, remittance services.36
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/latinamericathecaribbean/elsalvador/el_
salvador_2005_sp.pdf.
28
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 26–29.
29
See, e.g., Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 40 (2007) (noting that migration increases “when economic
times are good and jobs are plentiful in the United States and ebb when the economy weakens and job
availability slackens”); Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate,
Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (crediting the U.S.
economy’s “demand for millions of essential workers” with luring immigrants to the country).
30
See, e.g., Palma Torrisi, Salvadorans’ Remittances as Unique Consequences: The Place for
Salvadorans’ Remittances in the Determination of the Extreme Hardship Requirement of the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 9 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 87, 89 (2001) (“The
violence which characterized the civil war, in which one of every hundred Salvadorans was killed (they
were mostly civilians and were often tortured), coincided with the massive outflow of one of every six
Salvadorans to the United States.”).
31
Id. at 139 (citing as examples Hurricane Mitch and three earthquakes in 2001). The damaging
effects of the 2001 earthquakes include loss of life, destruction of housing, and infrastructural damage.
Pan American Health Organization, Earthquakes in El Salvador, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL BULL., Mar.
2001, at 1, available at http://www.paho.org/english/sha/be_v22n1-cover.htm.
32
Sabine et al., supra note 10, at 2.
33
Manuel Orozco explains, “[t]he economic context of a typical family with bi-national or
transnational obligations include sending of remittances, keeping in touch through telephone or visits
home or from relatives, buying home country goods, or property.” MANUEL OROZCO, THE
SALVADORAN DIASPORA: REMITTANCES, TRANSNATIONALISM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES, 2
(2004). There are non-familial remittances, “collective transfers, for instance through a hometown
association, usually directed towards a collective beneficiary,” but the bulk of remittances “are the
classical intra-family transfers that are usually associated with the word remittances.” Jørgen Carling,
Policy Options for Increasing the Benefits of Remittances 7 (Univ. of Oxford Ctr. on Migration, Policy
& Soc’y, Working Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/
papers/WP0408.pdf.
34
Sarah Gammage, Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development Strategy for
El Salvador 11 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
35
LET’S GO CENTRAL AMERICA 252 (Benjamin Krutzinna ed., 9th ed. 2004).
36
According to a 2002 report, forty-seven percent of Latino remitters have arrived in the United
States over the last ten years, a statistic that emphasizes the importance of recent immigration on
remittance growth. Dulce C. Benavides, The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National
Survey of Latinos: A Demographic Portrait of Latino Remittance Senders in the United States, in
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Given the amount of money entering Latin America, it is important to
consider the linked ways, beyond scale alone, that remittances impact Latin
American countries: (1) consumption and poverty reduction, and (2)
macro-economic effects and long-term national development. While these
particular issues will be treated separately, their connectedness should not
be forgotten. Remittances existed prior to their current popularization;
they simply were “hidden in plain view,” relegated to the “errors and
omissions columns in international financial reports.”37 Bringing out the
importance of remittances is an ongoing process and, thus, requires a note
about figures and conclusions. Much is now known about remittances, but
the recent flurry of research, programs,38 and interest in remittances cannot
disguise the fact that this is a nascent, and consequently very fluid, area of
research.39
As the paired Washington and Usulután lines illustrate, remittance
transfers are a consequence of transnational families. Mr. Remittances,
Manuel Orozco,40 defines a transnational family as “a unit with household
members across borders that stay in regular contact to maintain their bonds
and responsibilities.”41 Though their sacrifices are not often noted, such
family bonds persist in the face of the many challenges of separation,
distance, and often poverty within both the United States and Latin
American parts of the family. “At the simplest level, remittances reflect
the profound emotional bonds and constant interaction,” Roberto Suro

BILLIONS IN MOTION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES AND BANKING 19 (2002), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/13.pdf. Yet, “[e]ven though, the money flow drops off among
those with longer tenure, a substantial proportion of immigrants (23 percent) who have been away from
home for 20 to 30 years still send money back to their relatives.” ROBERTO SURO, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT FUND & PEW HISPANIC CTR., REMITTANCE SENDERS AND RECEIVERS: TRACKING THE
TRANSNATIONAL CHANNELS 5–6 (2003), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/23.pdf.
37
MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, supra note 8, at 1.
38
See e.g., Earth Inst. at Columbia Univ. Ctr. on Globalization & Sustainable Dev., Program on
Remittances and Development, http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/remittances/index.html
(last visited July 13, 2008) (program at Columbia University); Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard,
Remittances and Migration, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/remittances/index.html (last visited July 13,
2008) (five research projects at Harvard University); Inter-American Dialogue: Remittance Project,
available at http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=80.
39
See WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xi (noting that “basic data on migration and remittances are
lacking, so predicting the impact of policy changes can be problematic”); Richard H. Adams, Jr. &
John Page, Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33
WORLD DEV. 1645, 1660 (2005) (arguing that “more accurate data” is needed on unofficial remittance
flows); Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 193 (noting the unreliability of calculating
remittances).
40
Title used by Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, to introduce Manuel
Orozco at the release of the Second Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Task Force on
Remittances, Dirksen Senate Office Building, May 1, 2007.
41
MANUEL OROZCO, TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES: LIVES ON THE EDGE BUT IN PURSUIT OF
CHANGE 2 (2006), available at http://www.remittances.eu/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_
download/gid,27/ (last visited July 13, 2008).
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explains, “between relatives separated by geography and borders.”42
Academic over-conceptualization of the choices made by migrants and
households in developing countries43 risks hiding, even diminishing, the
hard work and love that underlie remittance sending.44 Many remittancesending migrants have braved long distances, la migra, and cultural loss,
and intellectualizing these often painful decisions can lead to failure to
understand the sacrifices involved.45 Generally speaking, remittances have
a simple explanation: “Workers leave their home countries for higher paid
jobs abroad and, through a combination of hard work and thrift, send a
portion of their earnings back home to support their families.”46
B. Consumption and Poverty Reduction
Remittances are, in many respects, a form of consumption by each
remitting immigrant, albeit consumption of a particular sort. Immigrants
spend eighty-five percent of their money in the United States, with the

42
Roberto Suro, A Survey of Remittance Senders and Receivers, in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE:
MAKING MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 21, 22 (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005).
43
See, e.g., Mariano Sana & Douglas S. Massey, Household Composition, Family Migration, and
Community Context: Migrant Remittances in Four Countries, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 509, 510 (2005)
(emphasizing that “an implicit or explicit contractual arrangement between the family and the migrant”
is a “necessary condition” for migration according to the new economics of labor migration).
44
See Ezra Rosser, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 12
(highlighting love as the foremost aspect of remittances and transnational families); Torrisi, supra note
30, at 127 (defining remittances as monies sent by “ the alien” to “loved ones left behind in the alien’s
country of origin”); see also MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, REMITTANCES
2005: TRANSFORMING LABOR MARKETS AND PROMOTING FINANCIAL DEMOCRACY, STATISTICAL
COMPARISONS
2
(2005),
available
at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?
docnum=639199 (“[T]he driving force behind [remittances] remains a fundamentally human
connection: a commitment to family values lies at the core of these flows.”). Ester Hernandez and
Susan Bibler Coutin critique the focus on the connection between love and remittances as overlooking
the labor underlying remittances. Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 190. Yet while
Hernandez and Bibler Coutin are right to note that immigrants earn their money through hard work, the
choice to send that money to family members reflects love.
45
Sana and Massey break the familial decision to migrate and remit into two possible
explanations, the first focused on risk diversification and the search for investment capital, and the
second “based on need,” defined as being less carefully planned and aimed to ensure family subsistence
when home country opportunities are lacking. Sana & Massey, supra note 43, at 512. Inadequate or
wrong information can distort both the first and second categories identified by Sana and Massey by,
for example, falsely glorifying the job opportunities in the destination country. See WORLD BANK,
supra note 1, at 61 (highlighting the effect distance and language differences can have on migrants’
knowledge, potentially lessened by diasporas already established in origin countries). But see GORDON
H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 12
(2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ImmigrationCSR26.pdf
(noting the “responsiveness of illegal immigration to [actual] economic conditions”).
46
Donald F. Terry, Remittances as a Development Tool, in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: MAKING
MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 3, 4 (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005); see also
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 35 (presenting the choices of a fictional couple contemplating their
household income in their home country versus their income if one member migrates to a higher
income country). Risk diversification, in addition to high/low-income country wage differentials, may
provide additional migration incentive. Id. at 59.
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remaining fifteen percent of their earnings sent to their country of origin.47
Remittances are typically “earmarked to assist with specific household
expenses.”48 Initially, such a split in local versus distant purchases may
seem to make remittance purchases categorically distinct from
“consumption.” Yet, perhaps tellingly, in The Economic Consequences of
the Peace, John Maynard Keynes described the privilege of the
Englishman who felt it “normal” that he could purchase goods from all
over the world.49 Currently, immigrant purchases of goods—through
remittances—for their household members still living in their homeland
are accomplished through their family as agents and are not seen as
“normal.” Nevertheless, to the extent that consumption is the end result,
the Englishman’s (and implicitly the average American’s) purchases are in
many ways analogous to those of the Salvadoran immigrant.50
The fact that the Salvadoran’s family members do not live in the same
house should not necessarily force a definitional re-characterization of
remittances as a “gift” rather than a purchase.51 For while in American law
there is a preoccupation with the household as the unit of analysis,52 is
there really a qualitative difference between an Englishman purchasing
school books for his child and a Salvadoran doing the same simply because
the Salvadoran’s purchase is accomplished through an aunt or uncle acting
as his agent? Just as spending on education positively impacts the
performance of children of non-immigrants in the United States, so too can
Salvadorans sending remittances expect improved educational achievement
by their family members.53
1. Remittance Purchases
An argument remains that despite similar goals, there is a fundamental
difference in “remittance” and “normal” purchases, namely that remittance
47
Manuel Orozco & Nancy Castillo, Latino Migrants: A Profile on Remittances, Finances, and
Health 6 (2008) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
48
JERONIMO CORTINA & RODOLFO DE LA GARZA, TOMÁS RIVERA POLICY INSTITUTE,
IMMIGRANT REMITTING BEHAVIOR AND ITS DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR MEXICO AND EL
SALVADOR 1 (2004).
49
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 11–12 (1920).
50
As Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin explain: “Remittances are part of a broader
circulation of money and, in some cases, are very much like regular expenses that individuals assume
(e.g. the upkeep of one’s home, the maintenance of one’s family members), with the key difference
that, given the dispersal of household members, payments cross national boundaries.” Hernandez &
Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 195.
51
But see id. at 194 (describing remittances as “products and gifts”).
52
For a recent example, see Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 229 (2006).
53
Alejandra Cox Edwards & Manuelita Ureta, International Migration, Remittances, and
Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador, 72 J. OF DEV. ECON. 429 (2003) (finding that remittances have
a positive impact on schooling, especially in rural areas); Ratha, supra note 19, at 6 (“Studies based on
household surveys in El Salvador . . . find that children of remittance-receiving households have a
lower school dropout ratio and that these households spend more on private tuition for their children.”).
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54

purchases require an agent.
After all, whereas the Englishman or the
American goes directly to Tesco or Wal-mart respectively, usually a family
member of the Salvadoran migrant collects the remitted money and then
makes the household purchases. That the purchases occur through an
agent and in a separate country can affect incentives to work and the cost
of goods in the recipient country,55 but family member reliability
minimizes the need to consider the traditional agency concern that the
agent will not follow desires of the principal. Surveys of remittance
senders and recipients asking senders why they sent money and asking
recipients how they actually spent the remittance attest to the
trustworthiness of recipients. As Orozco explains, there is “very little
dissonance between what the senders think they are sending aid for and
what their relatives said they are spending it on.”56 For those migrants
concerned relatives will not put their money to the use preferred, migrants
in bigger cities can pick particular products out of catalogues or store
displays, and relatives can then pick up the goods at traditional stores in El
Salvador.57
Remittance senders are “primarily motivated to contribute to family
maintenance” of those still in their home country,58 and, accordingly, most
of the money sent is “used for basic needs, such as food, medicine and
shelter.”59 There is no single bundle of goods purchased with remittances
that holds across all countries or years, but looking at how remittances are
spent in two countries can provide a snapshot of remittance use:60

54
Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 197 (“[T]he benefits that remittances may
provide to poor families may be undermined by a ‘moral hazard problem’ created by the distance
between remitters and recipients.”).
55
See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text.
56
OROZCO, supra note 41, at 1, 8 (reporting on the results of a survey of twenty-two families).
57
Indeed, one such company, Unicomer, has a showroom within the Salvadoran consulate’s
office complex in Houston. Jenalia Moreno, Store Makes Long-Distance Gifts Easy: Customers Order
Items for Delivery to Their Relatives in Latin America, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 20, 2006, at 1
(Business); see, e.g., Deborah Belgum, Special Delivery: Company Helps Immigrants Care for
Relatives Back Home by Providing U.S. Outlet for Buying Appliances That Can Be Received Across
Border, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at 21 (allowing immigrants to select items from a catalog for
delivery to their families in Mexico); de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 29 (“[E]ven some retail stores
in El Salvador offer migrants the option to purchase goods that are delivered to their relatives in their
home countries.”); Derek Reveron, La Curacao Cashes In, ADWEEK’S MARKETING MEDIOS, May 1,
2006, http://www.marketingymedios.com/marketingymedios/magazine/article_display.jsp?vnu_content
_id=1002425665 (affording immigrants the opportunity to build credit histories).
58
CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 21; see also Torrisi, supra note 30, at 104 (“The
alien subjectively believes that, without her continued remittances, her family in the homeland will
suffer acute economic hardship . . . .”).
59
Krissah Williams, Immigrants Sending $45 Billion Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2006, at A9.
60
Table based upon CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 28 tbl.6 (based upon 2003
figures, numbers rounding explains deviation from one-hundred percent).
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With food and basic consumption amounting to over two-thirds of
remittance use in Mexico and El Salvador, one might think that it would be
easy to claim that remittances have a net positive impact on poverty and
inequality in recipient countries. For, while migrants also send remittances
to buy land or for special events that fall outside of narrow understandings
of “need,” such as weddings or quinceañeras,61 it seems almost
definitional—more money is flowing in—that remittances lower the
poverty rate in recipient countries.62 To the question, “do remittances
reduce inequality and poverty?” a World Bank report on Latin American
remittances notes, “[i]n theory, given that in many cases remittances go to
poor households and that remittances directly increase these households’
level of income, an unequivocally positive answer could be expected.”63
2. Remittances’ Impact on Poverty
Given the conclusion of the last paragraph, it is probably not surprising
that the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality is less than
straightforward. After noting that “very little attention has been paid to
analyzing the poverty impact of these financial transfers on developing
countries,” a recent study on global migration and remittances tentatively
concluded, “on average, a 10% increase in per capita official remittances
will lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty.”64
61
Mariano Sana, Buying Membership in the Transnational Community: Migrant Remittances,
Social Status and Assimilation, 24 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 231, 239 (2005) (“Community
rituals such as weddings, baptisms or funerals offer ideal venues for migrants to display spending
power, claim status, and have it valorized. Migrants pay for rounds of drinks and multiple expenses
tied to local festivities, including musicians’ fees. Together with gifts packed in heavy suitcases,
migrants use these spending displays to assert their success in the United States.”).
62
After all, “the flow of familial remittances necessarily increases GDP per capita of those who
receive them, clearly making them better off.” CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 33.
63
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 12.
64
Adams, Jr. & Page, supra note 39, at 1645, 1660. But see CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at
15–16 (arguing that the Adams & Page study is “likely to underestimate the poverty effects of
remittances” and fails to highlight variation across countries).

2008]

15

IMMIGRANT REMITTANCES
65

While “[r]emittances are not a panacea for poverty reduction,” they do
play an important role, albeit one that is highly contextual and varies
across countries.66
Poverty reduction findings are reassuring for those who emphasize the
importance of remittances. It appears migrants are managing to send
sufficiently high remittances to make up for their losses of income
associated with local jobs held prior to departing their home country.67
Drawing attention to the scale of remittances alone, without
acknowledging the loss in income from work done prior to migration, risks
exaggerating the impact of remittances.68 A recent study found that fortyfour percent of remittance senders had a full-time job before coming to the
United States.69 In some instances, remittance effects should be discounted
by loss of pre-emigration income; yet, some situations call for an approach
that does not consider loss in pre-migration income when doing so is
inappropriate given the cause of the migration. In such circumstances,
migration is “treated as exogenously given.”70 Arguably, Salvadoran
migration motivated (necessitated?) by the civil war falls into this
migration category, in which case remittance effects should not be lessened
by pre-migration wages.
Looking at El Salvador’s experience reveals both the tremendous
promises and potential pitfalls of a poverty-centered approach to
understanding remittances. First, a note on terms, from economist Jeffrey
Sachs:
Extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as getting
by on an income of less than $1 a day, means that households
cannot meet basic needs for survival. . . . Moderate poverty,
defined as living on $1 to $2 a day, refers to conditions in

65
INT’L DEV. COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: HOW TO MAKE
MIGRATION WORK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION, 2003-4, H.C. 79-I, at 61 [hereinafter HOUSE OF
COMMONS], available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/
79/79.pdf.
66
Given migrant population differences along education, class, and opportunity lines, as well as
differing recipient-country characteristics, the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality is highly
country-specific. WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 91 (“One of the challenges of understanding
remittance flows is that their characteristics, costs, and channels vary widely from one bilateral corridor
to another (and also widely from different locations within each country).”).
67
But see Hernán Rozemberg, Drawback to Money Sent to Mexico?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, at 5B (suggesting that some immigrants from rural parts of Mexico earn more
prior to emigrating to the United States).
68
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 14; Ratha, supra note 19, at 5.
69
INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, PUBLIC OPINION
RESEARCH STUDY OF LATIN AMERICAN REMITTANCE SENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2006),
available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=826095 [hereinafter PUBLIC
OPINION RESEARCH STUDY].
70
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 118.
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which basic needs are met, but just barely.

Remittances have cut extreme poverty in three countries—Mexico, the
Dominican Republic, and El Salvador—by more than thirty-five percent
and moderate poverty by an average of nineteen percent, according to a
World Bank estimate.72 Furthermore, El Salvador’s “progressively
distributed . . . remittances are associated with significant reductions in
both inequality and poverty.”73
For a country where between twelve and eighteen percent of the
population still lives in extreme poverty (depending on whether you use a
nationally defined line or a U.S. $1/day line),74 these poverty and
inequality reduction figures attributable to remittances are striking. El
Salvador is still recovering from its long civil war which lasted twelve
years (1980–1992) and retarded economic growth. The country has yet to
reach pre-civil war per capita levels; the World Bank estimates that, if the
current growth trend continues, the economy will take until 2015 to reach
the country’s 1978 levels.75 And while the period immediately following
the war was marked by a faster growth rate and saw poverty reduced by
twelve percent,76 since 1995, the growth rate under post-Cristiani
presidents has fallen.77 For the Salvadoran poor, remittances in some
respects made up for the economic slowdown. It was remittances, not
economic growth or other pro-poor development policies of the
government, that instigated gains in progressive income distribution and in
equaling reduction after 1995.78
The welfare-improving effect of remittances is strikingly overlooked
through a narrow focus on poverty headcount figures alone. Most Central
American recipients are using remittances primarily to meet their basic
food needs and, therefore, still need additional income in order to meet
other necessities.79 This fact suggests that rather than remittances being
properly subject to critique for not being tied to a greater percentage
decrease in poverty, remittances should be seen as a very effective
71

Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty, TIME, Mar.14, 2005, at 42.
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 13.
73
Id. at 15. The report notes a Salvadoran Gini coefficient equality improvement of 2.1% driven
by remittances. Id. at 13.
74
PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, PNUD, EL SALVADOR,
CUADERNOS SOBRE DESARROLLO HUMANO 16 tbl.2 (May 2007), available at http://www.pnud.
org.sv/2007/content/view/27/83?id_publ=74 (follow hyperlink to pdf document).
75
WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM 12 (2003)
(Background Studies Report No. 26238) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM].
76
Id.
77
Alfredo Cristiani was the El Salvadoran president who signed the country’s peace agreements
on behalf of the government. UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS, supra note 27, at ch. 3 fig.3.2; see
EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 18 (noting a decline of economic growth
from 11% to 1.5% during the 1990s).
78
EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 13–16.
79
OROZCO, supra note 41, at 2.
72
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mechanism for reaching migrant family members in need. This is true
whether the need is ongoing—income support to meet basic food needs—
or the result of an adverse income or welfare shock. Remittances not only
raise recipient consumption levels, they “may play a significant role in
smoothing consumption.”80 For example, remittances rose in the wake of
devastating hurricanes that hit Central America.81 Such increases are not
temporary guilt-based gifts, but an increase that can be tracked over the
five year period following hurricanes.82 Finally, even where the shock is
purely economic, there is the strong possibility that remittances are
counter-cyclical, providing additional resources when the home country’s
economy is not doing as well.83 In addition to disaster response, countercyclical sending further demonstrates that remittances provide both for
necessary items, such as basic food, and invaluable recipient incomesmoothing.
Remittances are typically a very personal—family member to family
member—exchange. However, collective remittances, primarily through
hometown associations, can also help lessen the effects of poverty,
primarily, but not exclusively, through economic development projects.
Collective remittances, defined as “groups’ initiatives to finance and carry
out projects to benefit their communities of origin,”84 to Latin America are
predominantly channeled through hometown associations (HTA). “[T]he
hometown association has a long and familiar history,” Orozco explains.85
“[The HTA] draws together people from the same town or state in the
migrant-sending country, enabling them to retain a sense of community as
they adjust to the United States.”86 Participation in hometown associations
is “a way [for immigrants] to validate their identity,”87 and, perhaps, help
ensure social standing in their home community.88 Hometown associations
do everything from organizing social events in the United States, to
helping maintain North-South connections between members of a
particular town, to sending collectively raised money and resources to their
80

WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 122.
Ratha, supra note 19, at 3.
82
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 123 (“In cross-country data, a dollar’s worth of hurricane
damage leads to roughly $0.13 in additional remittances in the year of the hurricane and $0.28 cents
over five years.”).
83
Ratha, supra note 19, at 3.
84
Luin Goldring, Re-Thinking Remittances: Social and Political Dimensions of Individual and
Collective Remittances 6 (York Univ. Ctr. for Research on Latin Am. and the Caribbean, Working
Paper Series, 2003).
85
Id.
86
Manuel Orozco, Latino Hometown Associations as Agents of Development in Latin America, in
SENDING MONEY HOME: HISPANIC REMITTANCES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 85, 87 (Rodolfo
O. de la Garza & Briant Lindsay Lowell eds., 2002).
87
Manuel Orozco, Central American Diasporas and Hometown Associations, in DIASPORAS AND
DEVELOPMENT 215, 221 (Barbara J. Merz et al. eds., 2007).
88
Sana, supra note 61, at 239.
81

18

[Vol. 41:1

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
89

town of origin for infrastructure and poverty-reduction projects.
The paired impact of migration and hometown associations is
strikingly evident in El Salvador’s Intipuca City.90
Intipuqueños,
Salvadoran migrants from Intipuca, maintain a strong connection with their
native city. Intipuca—with signs primarily in English and a more elaborate
infrastructure than other similarly sized towns—is full of reminders that,
while the war led to a massive migration to the Washington, D.C. area,
many Intipuqueños still consider Intipuca home.91 The city reflects both
familial remittances—allowing a level of housing construction quality that
is unusual for such a rural town—and collective efforts of the United
Committee for Intipuca, which, together with matching funds from the
Salvadoran government, has helped build projects such as stadium fields
and septic systems.92 Indeed, in El Salvador, Intipuca is sometimes called
either “city of dollars” or “gringo city.”93 What remains true for HTAs, as
well as for familial remittances, is that “although remittances to families
and donations to communities are channeled primarily to the poor, these
resources alone do not constitute a solution to the structural constraints of
poverty.”94
The transnational Intipuca City community reflects
tremendous efforts on the part of the home and migrant populations and is
not simply the product of an infusion of money.95 Collective remittances
impact poverty, and, by bringing migrants together, might do so in ways
that traditional remittances may not. Moreover, collective remittances
reflect the connection that hermanos lejanos have not only to the family
members they left behind but also to their communities.
Understanding the impact of remittances on poverty requires
89
See Rafael Alarcón, The Development of Hometown Associations in the United States and the
Use of Social Remittances in Mexico, in SENDING MONEY HOME: HISPANIC REMITTANCES AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 101, 108–12 (Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Briant Lindsay Lowell eds.,
2002) (detailing the HTA range of activities and the many ways HTA target matters that particularly
affect the poor in origin country hometowns).
90
See, e.g., Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 199 (reporting that their “interviewees
marvelled at the town of Intipucá, which has become known as a modern, highly Americanized
community supported almost entirely by remittances”).
91
The Intipuca City’s unofficial website, www.intipucacity.com, is a catalogue of stories of
hermanos lejanos who have done well in the United States but still feel a close connection with their
city of origin.
92
Orozco, supra note 86, at 92.
93
David Pedersen, The Storm We Call Dollars: Determining Value and Belief in El Salvador and
the United States, 17 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 431, 433 (2002) (also identifying “town of thieves”
as a third name given to the city following the collapse of Banquito, an unofficial remittance transfer
operation and bank).
94
Manuel Orozco & Katherine Welle, Hometown Associations and Development: A Look at
Ownership, Sustainability, Correspondence, and Replicability, in NEW PATTERNS FOR MEXICO 157,
157 (Barbara J. Merz ed., 2005).
95
These efforts are driven by the requirements of self-identity and should not be reduced by the
diminutive label “nostalgia.” As Professor Anupam Chander writes, “[a]t times hope—and at other
times fear—compels many people to leave their homeland and settle abroad. But leaving home does
not necessarily eliminate one’s regard for that land or its people.” Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1098 (2001).
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considering the relative class position of both recipients and senders. In
testimony before the Senate regarding remittances, Illinois Congressman
Luis Gutierrez captured the income-smoothing and consumption aspects of
remittances but did so from the standpoint of migrants: “These are hardworking people, doing the hardest jobs, the longest hours, for the worst
pay. And what they are doing is helping their family members back in
their countries of origin, many times in moments of crisis.”96 At the same
committee hearing, Former Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes noted in his
introduction that the “[p]eople sending remittances tend to be low-wage
earners with modest formal education.”97 According to a recent survey of
remittance senders, “more than three-fifths of remittance senders can be
considered ‘working poor’ or ‘lower middle class’ with annual incomes of
less than $30,000,” and at least thirty-five percent of remittance senders
have a household income under $20,000.98
To understand why the United States is still considered a land of
opportunity for many Central American migrants, the salaries received in
the United States must be placed in context. According to the same survey
noted above, “[t]he average salary of the—first job of Latin American
immigrants in the U.S. was $900 a month—six times the amount they were
earning in their country.”99 Thus, two things seemingly in conflict are true.
The first truth is that, ultimately, both senders and recipients are families
living on the edge of poverty.100 The second is that remittance senders are
able to send money back to their home country because they make
tremendous sacrifices for their family members.101 Additionally, being
poor in the United States and being poor in Latin America does not mean
the same thing. This sentence risks being misread, so it is worth
clarification. I do not mean to diminish the hardships involved in being
96

Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Rep. Luis V. Guiterrez) [hereinafter
Hearing]; see also For Love or Money?, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 78 (“[A] migrant worker,
struggling to make ends meet in a foreign country, sends a big slice of his pay packet back to his
homeland.”).
97
Hearing, supra note 96, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). In fact, migrant education level and remittance sending are
negatively correlated: “the higher the education level of migrants relative to the population in their
home countries, the lower the amount of money sent home.” Yoko Niimi & Çağlar Özden, Migration
and Remittances: Causes and Linkages 10 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4087,
2006).
98
PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH STUDY, supra note 69, at 3, 9. Remittance senders from Central
America are also young, with over half aged 18 to 34. Id. at 6. Manuel Orozco puts the percentage
earning less than $20,000 at “[a]bout half of both men and women.” OROZCO, supra note 41, at 3.
99
PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH STUDY, supra note 69, at 11.
100
Torrisi, supra note 30, at 133.
101
Writing about Salvadoran immigrants living on Long Island and sending money back to El
Salvador, Professor Sarah Mahler observes, “Salvadorans make sacrifices. Sometimes they deprive
themselves of comforts . . . . The strain can be overwhelming . . . .” SARAH J. MAHLER, SALVADORANS
IN SUBURBIA: SYMBIOSIS AND CONFLICT 104 (1995).
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poor in the United States, nor do I wish to suggest, as the Heritage
Foundation has, that the U.S. poor are not poor.102 Yet, if remittance
senders were suffering under absolute poverty of the sort captured by the
World Bank’s definitions of “extreme” or “moderate” poverty, remittance
senders would not have money to send back to their family members who
did not migrate with them. This does not mean they are not struggling, but
it does demonstrate the inspiring commitment that remittance senders—
prioritizing sending their money over paying their own bills—have to their
family members.103
C. Macro Effects and National Development
Remittances impact not only recipient families but also, in the
aggregate, have important and potentially negative consequences for the
economies of remittance-receiving countries. While the sacrifices of
immigrants and those left behind when an immigrant leaves make it
inappropriate to characterize remittances as a “windfall” to recipient
families, at the national level remittances arguably are a form of
“unearned” national income. This has possible positive and negative
consequences for recipient-countries. In this Part, the impact of rational
remittance windfalls will be explored along three central economic
avenues: (1) pricing of goods, (2) bank and national borrowing, and (3)
work incentives.
Remittances can distort the pricing of even the most basic goods and
can lead to inefficient remittance-driven, rather than growth-driven, use of
resources. Additionally, remittances can exacerbate problematic class
dynamics, creating a division between those who are poor and do not
receive remittances and those who are remittance recipients. Even a
seemingly unambiguously positive consequence of large remittance
flows—the ability of local banks and recipient countries to get cheaper
loans through the securitization of remittance flows—must be examined
closely. Positively, thousands of small transfers can reduce the national
cost of capital, which in turn can help with both debt payments and with
economic development. But, despite the fact such securitization is driven
by the assets (the predictable and substantial flow of money) of the people,
la gente, and not of wealthy elites, there is the danger that international
102
See, e.g., Robert Rector & Kirk A. Johnson, Understanding Poverty in America,
BACKGROUNDER: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 5, 2004 (noting
that material hardship—lack of food, housing, and clothing—does exist in the United States, but that “it
is quite restricted in scope and severity”).
103
Three-fourths of remittance senders in one recent survey reported so ordering their finances.
Suro, supra note 42, at 25. As one participant in Suro’s survey reported, “Before anything, I send them
the money because they count on it . . . . Then afterwards I pay my bills, my rent, but the first thing I do
is send it.” Id.; accord Torrisi, supra note 30, at 134 (noting that remittances “exacerbate [senders]
own household economic problems”).
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banks and local elites will succeed in capturing the value associated with
the securitization based reduced cost of capital. Remittances can reduce
the incentive of recipient families to work, leading to remittance
dependence and harming national growth. Finally, while remittances
typically are sent family member to family member, collective remittances
can fund home country improvement and development that would not take
place without such hermano lejano support.
1. Price of Goods
Sudden riches can create many problems for an economy, and
remittance-driven gains are no exception. Remittances are foreign-earned
money that can raise the cost of goods in the recipient-country. The
recipient country has not increased production, yet there is more money in
circulation owing to the remittances; hence, prices rise. If the nation-state
is seen in isolation, then such price increases owe themselves not to any
improvement in the economy, but to an exogenous—arguably false—
increase in purchasing power.104
Recipient economies flush with
remittance money become vulnerable both to inflation, particularly
harmful to those not receiving remittances, and, through labor reduction, to
falling exports as the economy reacts to the increased remittances. It is
consequently clear that countries ignore at their own peril the economic
challenges inherent when an economy is injected with extra capital
divorced from national production.
The export and price effects of remittances can be illustrated through
El Salvador’s remittance experience. Following the 1992 peace agreement
that ended the country’s civil war, El Salvador experienced a period of
rapid growth. The high consumption that marked the period “was to some
extent facilitated and reinforced by the massive inflow of workers’
remittances.” Yet, these remittances were also “associated with an
expansion of the money supply, higher domestic credit and high inflation
until 1995.”105 Dollarization of the Salvadoran economy linked their
104
As is the case with sudden natural resource wealth (discoveries of gold or oil), “‘Dutch
disease’s effects of remittances . . . [are] likely to be large in small economies.” Ratha, supra note 19,
at 7. Furthermore, remittances generally are unlike many other exogenous shifts in that they tend to
“grow gradually over long periods,” thus reducing Dutch disease effects. WORLD BANK, supra note 1,
at 86.
105
EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 12. While El Salvador
experienced higher domestic credit and inflation, even purely consumptive use of remittances “may
stimulate development, especially if [remittances] are spent locally.” Outward Bound—Emigration,
ECONOMIST, Sep. 28, 2002, (Special Report), at 1. Consumptive remittance use will have a multiplier
effect on the economy when it makes up for “insufficient demand” in the economy. WORLD BANK,
supra note 1, at 124. Consumption driven commercial development often surprises visitors to San
Salvador who are unprepared for the wealth on display in several of the newer shopping centers. The
newest and most extravagant, La Gran Via and Multiplaza, opened in 2005, complete with extensive
marble floors and upscale restaurants, and they join Galerias, a mall built around an existing mansion,
as the high-end shopping centers. Tourists need to be mindful that “capital accumulation diverted to
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106

inflation to our own, but, arguably, remittances have played a role in
reducing the international competitiveness of traditional agricultural
exports.107 With the receipt of remittances, rural Salvadoran families can
choose not to work on large coffee and sugar fincas (large
farms/plantations), forcing finca owners to rely upon Honduran immigrant
labor.108
Prices for goods also rise through remittance receipts.
Dramatically, towns far removed from the capital city are able to support
Western fast-food restaurants such as Pizza Hut, but less dramatically,
remittance-backed demand can push up the costs of even basic supplies
and food items.109 For a country which only recently began to implement a
very limited welfare system for the truly needy,110 to the extent that
remittances do not have a trickle-down effect, those who do not receive
remittances are harmed by their relative worsening position compared to
remittance-receiving families.111
build ostentatious cities may lead to incorrect economic analyses in comparisons of the wealth of
cities.” PAUL BAIROCH, ECONOMICS AND WORLD HISTORY: MYTHS AND PARADOXES 108 (1993).
106
El Salvador’s transition from a local currency to U.S. dollars was facilitated by remittancereceipts which provided needed hard currency for the switch to a dollar economy. See El Salvador:
Dollars and Debts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2000 (noting the hurdles of transitioning from local currency
to U.S. dollars). For more on El Salvador’s adoption of the dollar, see El Salvador Learns to Love the
Greenback, ECONOMIST, Sep. 28, 2002.
107
Remittances, by facilitating stronger bonds between hermanos lejanos and their family still
living in El Salvador, may however simultaneously play a role in creating a new export market in
“nostalgic goods.” The Role of Remittances in Leveraging Sustainable Development in Latin America
and the Caribbean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy,
Trade and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Manuel
Orozco),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/
htorozco030707.pdf (testimony presented on March 6, 2007). The sale of such goods, whether in the
form of Fernando Llort prints, artwork from La Palma, or La Alianza soccer jerseys, is on the rise and
is another reminder of the continued importance hermanos lejanos give the country they left behind.
108
Sarah Gammage, El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration Continues, COUNTRY
PROFILES, July 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=636; WORLD
BANK, PROSPECTS, SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES, http://econ.worldbank.org
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~pagePK:6416540
1~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (follow hyperlink “(1) Bilateral Migration Matrix”).
109
Luis Rene Caceres & Nolvia N. Saca, What do Remittances Do? Analyzing the Private
Remittance Transmission Mechanism in El Salvador (IMF, Working Paper, 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06250.pdf.
110
El Salvador’s welfare program, Red Solidaria, was established in March 2005. CAROLINA
ÁVALOS & CECILIA GALLARDO, SECRETARÍA TÉCNICA DE LA PRESIDENCIA, PROGRAMA RED
SOLIDARIA, PROGRAMA SOCIAL DE ATENCIÓN INTEGRAL A LAS FAMILIAS EN EXTREMA POBREZA DE EL
SALVADOR: DOCUMENTO TÉCNICO RED SOLIDARIA, app. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.redsolidaria.gob.sv/especiales/cd/ (follow “documento” hyperlink). For more on Red
Solidaria, see Tatiana Britto, Conceptual and Operational Features of El Salvador’s CCT Program
(United Nations Development Program, Working Paper Powerpoint, 2007), available at
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/paper-seminar/MissionTatiana.pdf.
111
The remittance-receipt split in purchasing power is most dramatically evident in the classified
ads for housing published by both La Prensa Grafica and Diario Del Hoy, both of which regularly
feature numerous ads targeted explicitly at remittance-receiving families or at visiting hermanos
lejanos seeking to provide for their parents or other family who they came to El Salvador to visit.
Remittances “benefit particular households and communities which receive remittances, and—unless
they generate significant multiplier effects—may lead to heightened inequality between remittance–
rich and remittance–poor households.” HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 61.
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2. Bank and National Borrowing
For remittance-receiving countries, remittances are primarily a
personal matter between senders and recipient families. However, by
treating the predictable flow of remittances as an asset,112 recipient country
banks and governments can leverage remittances as collateral, reducing the
cost of borrowing.113 As the World Bank notes, “remittances are widely
dispersed, . . . and for the most part, remittances avoid the government
‘middleman.’”114 Leveraging remittance flows enables governments and
banks to benefit from the flow of many small transfers:
For some recipient countries, remittances are large
enough to have broader macroeconomic implications. By
generating a steady stream of foreign-exchange earnings,
they can improve a country’s creditworthiness for external
borrowing, and through innovative financing mechanisms
(such as securitization), they can expand access to capital and
lower borrowing costs.115
Remittance leveraging relies on the quantity and predictability of small
transfers to provide loan collateral.
From the perspective of remittance senders and recipient families,
there is nothing inherently wrong with the securitization of remittance
flows, whether such remittance-backed borrowing is undertaken by
recipient country banks or even governments.116 Such borrowing could,
Latin America’s poor are bifurcated by remittances in ways that reveal the hard choices families
make when considering emigration. In Enrique’s Journey, based on a feature story series for which she
won a Pulitzer, Sonia Nazario followed the footsteps of a Honduran boy as he crossed Mexico to reach
his mother in North Carolina. SONIA NAZARIO, ENRIQUE’S JOURNEY: THE STORY OF A BOY’S
DANGEROUS ODYSSEY TO REUNITE WITH HIS MOTHER (2007). The protagonist’s mother had been
forced to abandon her own children to seek work in the United States because in Honduras she did not
make enough to feed or educate her children. Id. at 3–4. Work in the United States translated into
remittance money for food, schooling, and even toys, but the most heart-breaking aspect of Nazario’s
reporting are the effects that growing up without their parents had on the children left behind. Id. at 11–
12. And it is not limited to emotional damage; Nazario suggests that the gang problem plaguing many
Central American countries is fueled in part by the hidden costs created by the effect of the departure of
remittance-providing family members on children left behind. Id. at 24. Yet, by presenting the
dramatically different housing quality that remittances enable, Nazario also shows the hardship faced
by those not supported by family members who emigrated to the United States. Id. at 17.
112
See Alvaro Lima & Peter Plastrik, Leveraging Immigrant Remittances for Development, NEW
ENG. COMTY. DEVS. 2006, at 1, 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass.) (explaining that
customer loyalty and the fact that remittance flows “are not severely affected by economic downturns”
make “banks . . . attracted to remittance flows”).
113
For more on securitization, see Suhas Ketkar & Dilip Ratha, Development Financing During a
Crisis: Securitization of Future Receivables 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 2582, 2001) (discussing the securitization potential of global remittances using 1998
figures).
114
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 105.
115
Id. at 86; de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 29.
116
For a technical explanation of how remittance cash flow securitization works, see Heather
Hughes, Understanding Securitization of Worker Remittances, in MOBILISING CAPITAL FOR THE
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for example, be directed towards pro-poor policies and programs. Even
reducing the cost of national debt through remittance backing can help the
remittance sending and receiving communities by allowing countries to
keep more money for social programs. Thus, using remittance flows to
lower debt payments arguably steers clear of the weak criticism that the
government is using people’s assets in a non-beneficial way. However, a
stronger version of this critique focuses not only on how the leveraged
borrowing is used, but also on the process by which such decisions are
made. The argument: since the money underlying remittance flow belongs
to remittance senders and recipients, the benefits that derive from the scale
and predictability of remittances flows belong in some way to the
community of senders and receivers. Yet, as Professor Heather Hughes
observes, regarding remittance securitization:
A tension exists between, on the one hand, any effort to proactively structure transactions to achieve certain collective,
substantive ends and, on the other hand, respecting the results
of market transactions entered into by developing region
banks as necessarily representative of local interests as they
define them. But at the same time it is not necessarily clear
whose interests any given originating bank represents.117
Remittance transmitting banks, and the governments that use such
banks, have a colorable argument that because they are facilitating such
transfers they have a claim on the benefits from these flows. As will be
discussed in Part III.A, remittance senders have seen the cost of sending
remittances fall remarkably over the past decade, and, to the extent that
banks are using gains from remittance-backed borrowing to pay for the
reduction in cost to remittance consumers, banks have a corresponding
claim on how remittance flows are leveraged.
3. Work Incentives
For receiving families, by making work less necessary and distorting
the perceived return from work, remittance income can and does diminish
the attractiveness of work. As the Economist observed, “[t]here may also
be economic costs associated with reliance on remittances. Like any
unearned wealth, they may foster idleness among those who benefit.”118
For Latin American countries, where the effect of work incentive data is
available, “remittances have the effect of reducing the number of hours
worked per week.”119 Income and substitution effects drive remittancePOOR—WHAT CAN STRUCTURED FINANCE CONTRIBUTE? (Ingrid Matthäus-Maier & J.D. von Pischke,
eds., forthcoming 2008).
117
Id. at 8.
118
The Importance of Remittances, supra note 7.
119
CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 31.
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based work reductions:
Remittances may tend to reduce the supply of labor
provided by remaining household members, who may take a
portion of the remittance gain as leisure. This income effect
is generally not a concern, because it represents part of the
welfare gain from remittances. By contrast, remittances may
change the return to supplying labor, for example, if the
migrant conditions the remittance on low household income.
Such a substitution effect will reduce the welfare gain from
remittances by distorting household labor decisions.120
While the income effect is a welfare gain to remittance-receiving
families, the income effect is a concern from a national and community
development concern. Remittance recipient “supplemental” leisure lowers
national production (subject to offset by increased spending made possible
by the remittances) and, by reducing the demand for employment, can lead
to elevated wages—relative to the wage-rate absent remittances—that
narrow the range of business types that can earn a profit.
Suppose a remittance recipient family is fortunate and receives $500
monthly from their hermano lejano. Family members quite rationally
might decide it is not worth working for a mere $185 per month—their
standard of living without accounting for leisure would be better if they
worked, but once leisure is taken into account, for some it can make sense
to rely solely on the remittances.121 The disincentive to work can be
exacerbated where the remittance sender is motivated to make sure basic
needs are met for family members back home. In turn, this would reduce
remittance sending were remittance-recipients able to meet some of their
needs through their own labor. Seen negatively, the substitution effect is a
case of recipient family members free-riding off the work of the remittance
sender. But such “free-riding” arguably reflects shared family values. If a
remittance sender is in a country where $185 can be earned through a few
days work and receivers would have to work all month for the same
amount of money, though the hermano lejano ultimately becomes the
burdened family member, this household labor distortion might be the
optimal ex ante, pre-emigration, allocation of labor. Even though the
hermano lejano conditions remittance sending on family need and would
lower the amount sent if need fell, the remittance sender may support the
decision of family members not to work in the home country’s lower
120

WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 123–24 (footnote omitted).
In some misleading respects this is similar to the problematic aspects of welfare Charles
Murray dramatized through his depiction of the choice to work and marry for his hypothetical couple,
Harold and Phyllis. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154–62 (1984). Such an analogy, however,
is misleading because remittance income is being “earned” by a member of the family, albeit one
working in another country.
121
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paying labor market.
Yet worthy of note, the intangible consequences of remittance-driven
work disincentives are hard to capture quantitatively. Work disincentives
do not simply lower the amount produced by recipient countries; reduced
need to work can alter the social fabric in countries where a large
percentage of people receive remittances. “[A] number of development
practitioners have noted the negative social implications associated with
the fact of important segments of the younger generation becoming used to
receiving steady flows of remittances without any effort on their part,” a
trend which can impact work incentives and life choices.122
The Salvadoran government faces a youth gang problem that not only
is a destabilizing force in the country but also is another connection
between El Salvador and the Salvadoran expatriate community.123 Mara
Salvatrucha, “The Most Dangerous Gang in America” according to
Newsweek, operates across the United States and Central America, with a
strong connection to El Salvador.124 While MS-13, as it is also known, is
more a byproduct of limited opportunities and ripple effects from the
Salvadoran civil war, remittances may play a role in acculturating youth to
not working traditional jobs to earn a living. While gang membership
undoubtedly reflects much more than an effect of remittances, an
exaggerated culture of consumerism is a likely offshoot of high remittance
receipts.
In considering the potential work disincentives associated with
remittances, perspective must be maintained regarding the relative scope of
the problem and the room for leisure choices in recipient countries.
Though remittance-recipients are subject to work disincentive concerns,
the effect of such disincentives are rarely raised when another group, hijos
de papi (Salvadoran slang for the children of the rich who live off the
largess of their parents), are considered. The exclusive examination of the
income of the poor remittance-recipients and simultaneous lack of
examination of the income of the wealthy should not be surprising, but
should also not distort how the choices facing remittance-recipients are
understood.125 The many effects remittances can have make it impossible
to closet the impact of remittances to a given set of inevitable
consequences. Thus, in the same recipient-country, some families’
remittances will help put food on the table, while, for others, remittances
may lead to voluntary underemployment or excessive consumerism. It is,
however, important not to conflate limited or theoretical remittance ills
122

CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 2.
See Coffino, supra note 23, at 203 (noting that “criminal violence continues to wreak havoc”
in El Salvador).
124
Arian Campo-Flores, The Most Dangerous Gang in America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2005.
125
Ezra Rosser, Obligations of Privilege, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 2 (2007).
123
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with actual rejection of work or rampant consumerism. “In Central
American countries, remittances may help households cope beyond
meeting their basic food needs, but they will still need additional income in
order to meet other necessities.”126 Manual Orozco estimates that “the cost
of living in Latin American countries is at least two or three times the
average amount received in remittances.”127 As one Salvadoran quoted in
the Nation stated, “I completely disagree that remesas make bums out of
us.”128 Even with remittances, most remittance-recipients are struggling to
provide for the basic needs of their family and are not in a position to make
an effort–leisure trade-off because of remittances.
D. Ownership of Remittances
The danger when considering the anti-poverty or development
potential of remittances is that researchers, and, more importantly policy
makers, might forget that remittances are more than simply monetary
flows; that remittance transfers belong to each migrant and recipient
family. So far this paper has highlighted the scale and anti-poverty aspects
of remittances—an emphasis that follows from the existing research on
remittances globally. For though there is variation country-to-country,129
generally, “[w]hile the impact of remittances on growth is unclear,
remittances do play an important role in reducing the incidence and
severity of poverty (with no significant effect on income inequality).”130
And while the focus is about to shift to structural impacts of remittances
and development potential, it is important to approach such considerations
from the right perspective. In thinking about remittances, it is the effect of
“personal flows from migrants to their friends and family” being discussed,
and, as such, remittances “should not be taxed or directed to specific
development uses.”131 As a World Bank remittance overview states:
In policy circles it is often debated whether there may be
ways to encourage the use of remittances for more productive
purposes than for consumption or for purchasing land and
houses. While such a question may be appropriate for
official aid flows, it is not entirely appropriate for personal
remittance flows.132
126

OROZCO, supra note 41, at 2.
Id.
128
Peter Davis, Letter from El Salvador: At the Edges of Empire, NATION, July 11, 2005, at 18.
129
For example, in El Salvador, remittances do reduce inequality. See supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
130
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xiii.
131
Ratha, supra note 19, at 1. It is worth noting that the argument that remittances themselves
should not be taxed or directed to specific uses does not necessarily undercut the argument that the
financing attendant to the remittance flows should be directed to specific development uses.
132
Maimbo & Ratha, supra note 5, at 7.
127
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And from the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Remittances:
In addressing these issues, the task force started with a
central premise—that the sending of remittances is
unambiguously a private matter and that the basis of any
constructive public policy or program is acknowledgment of
the private nature of these flows. Every member of the task
force agreed that remittances should not be taxed. They also
agreed that remittances should not be directed to government
programs . . . .133
Given the amount of money being sent North to South, from one
developing country to another, as well as the increasing recognition of the
scale of these remittance transfers, the temptation to attempt directing these
flows to better uses is ever-present.134 But with the determination of
“better use” by definition not following the sender’s priorities (except
perhaps in the case of money sent by hometown associations), the
paternalism that underlies this temptation ought to be troubling.
Attempting, to direct remittance use, now that the power of remittances is
receiving attention, may have the perverse effect of diminishing
remittances or at least driving remittance sending underground. More
fundamentally, directing remittance use is like mandating that purchasers
must buy apples instead of oranges. For, just as the decision between
apples or oranges is rightly understood as being within the province of the
purchaser, how migrants and their family members use their remittance
money is equivalently their call.
III. REMITTANCE COSTS, REGULATION, AND TAXATION
Remittance awareness has led to a number of remittance policy
challenges which owe themselves to rent-seeking efforts by money transfer
organizations and politicians. The primary challenges facing remittance
growth and effectiveness are lowering transfer costs and dealing with
regulatory threats. Through transfer costs and burdensome regulation,
businesses and governments seek to take a bite out of the money being sent
by immigrants to loved ones.
“Rent-seeking” describes efforts by individuals or institutions to
capture the value created by an activity in a way that does not add value.
This can be contrasted with “profit-seeking” activities which also seek to
capture returns or rewards, but do more than simply skim off value.
133

INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 4.
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xiii (“Despite the prominence given to remittances from
developed countries, South-South remittance flows make up between 30 and 45 percent of total
remittances received by developing countries, reflecting the fact that over half of migrants from
developing countries migrate to other developing countries.”).
134
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Financial intermediaries in the transfer of money from senders to recipients
seek to capture supra-normal profits through information asymmetries and
other market failures. Similarly, politicians seek to use the choice of
immigrants to send money to loved ones as an opportunity to extract a tax
from the immigrant population. In this Part, transfer costs and regulatory
effects are explored in turn.
Financial intermediaries stand in the middle of the remittance
relationship, charging a wide range of fees to deliver money (or remitted
goods). The range in fees suggests more is at play than simply market
differentiation. Market failure, or at least market opportunism, seems to
play a significant—though declining—role in preventing a decline in
remittance costs. If there is not a competitive remittance market, the
question becomes whether a laissez-faire approach emphasizing the power
of the invisible hand, market intervention, or legal regulation protective of
hermanos lejanos is the appropriate response to the anti-competitive forces
affecting the remittance market.
A. Remittance Transfer Costs
According to Adam Smith, the community benefits from the individual
self-interested actions of each individual, leading to socially optimal
outcomes solely through the workings of the market. Faith in the power of
the market is more justified when the market reflects competitive pricing:
An industry in which there are so many firms that no one
of them can influence the market price by its individual
decisions and in which there are so many consumers that the
individual utility-maximizing decisions of no one consumer
can affect the market price is called a perfectly competitive
industry.135
Were the remittance-sending market perfectly competitive, ignoring
for the moment forms of product differentiation such as time to delivery,
the observed differences in cost of sending remittances should collapse to a
single price point that could be expected to be at or below the current
lowest remittance-sending fees.136 This is clearly not the case. However,
135

ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 33 (4th ed. 2004).
Assistant Treasury Secretary Wayne A. Abernathy argued in testimony before Congress that
discussion that focuses on cost alone can be incomplete:
[R]emittance providers compete for business in many ways. Cost is one
factor. Other factors are speed, reliability, security, and convenience. Some
distribution services have a higher price than others. But they differ in other ways.
They may be offering more services. For example, some non-bank services charge
more than banks, but they may be more convenient to use, especially for the
recipients. In some countries, banks simply do not have branches in rural
communities. Using a bank might cost the sender less, but it might require the
recipient to walk several miles to the nearest bank, rather than to the nearest
136
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on both the “firm” and “consumer” sides of the supply-demand curves
there are some promising reasons to believe that the remittance-sending
industry has become, and will continue to become, more competitive.137
The size of the U.S. outbound remittance market has dramatically
expanded. By 2002, sending from the United States through remittances
was thirty-five times as large as it was in 1970, based purely on official
balance of payments statistics.138 According to a U.S. Federal Reserve
study, “[t]he remittance market is increasing rapidly in volume and
international importance,” and in 2004 included over $30 billion sent from
the United States to Latin America.139 Even with a more narrow focus on
the remittance market to El Salvador, the increasing volume of the market
is impressive.140
Just as demand has soared, additional organizations and companies
have stepped into the remittance market, constraining through their
presence the power of the earlier intermediary firms to dictate the market
price for sending remittances. In 2000, Manuel Orozco wrote an
informative article that marched through the various mechanisms for
sending remittances and the charges for sending $100, $200, or $300 using
each mechanism.141 Orozco presented the advantages/disadvantages and
distribution agent of the non-bank. Which costs more? Hard to say just by looking
at the price of the transmission in isolation.
Remittances: Reducing Costs, Increasing Competition, and Broadening Access to the Market: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Wayne A. Abernathy,
Assistant Treasury Secretary); see also Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency—A
Progress Report Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade,
and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong., 10, 65 (2007) (statement of Mark
Thompson, Western Union Company) (arguing that “[p]rice is not the sole factor considered by
consumers” and that “too often remittances are viewed by policymakers as a commodity”).
137
Price competition could inspire service competition, and vice versa, ideally with the winning
mix of firms offering a range of price points that allow remittance senders the ability to select their
preferred mix of service and expense.
138
Dilip Ratha, Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development
Finance, in REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, supra note 5, at 19, 26
fig.1.7; see also Acosta et al., supra note 20, at 958 (finding that “remittance flows to Latin America
have increased twenty-fold since 1980”).
139
Hilgert et al., supra note 24, at 2.
140
On the supply side, the fees for remittances reflect both the broader and more narrow markets
as some remittance intermediaries operate solely with the Salvadoran community and others deliver to
many other countries as well.
141
Manuel Orozco, Remittances and Markets: New Players and Practices (Inter-Am. Dialogue
and The Tomás Rivera Policy Inst., Working Paper, 2000), available at http://www.
microfinancegateway.com/files/21609_remit_and_market.htm [hereinafter Remittances and Markets].
In 2002, Orozco came out with another report, studying nearly eighty remittance companies, again
finding sending costs were too high. MANUEL OROZCO, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, ATTRACTING REMITTANCES: MARKET, MONEY AND REDUCED COSTS
(2002) [hereinafter ATTRACTING REMITTANCES], available at http://www.rree.gob.sv/sitio/img.nsf/
vista/documentos/$file/market%20money%20and%20costs.pdf. For more on IRNet and the efforts
credit unions have made to enter the remittance market, see ANNA CORA EVANS & JANETTE KLAEHN,
WORLD COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNIONS, INC., A TECHNICAL GUIDE TO REMITTANCES: THE CREDIT
UNION EXPERIENCE (Brian Branch ed., 2004), available at http://www.woccu.org/functions/view_
document.php?id=remittances_techguide.
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costs charged by Western Union, MoneyGram, the U.S. Postal Service’s
Dinero Seguro program, Gigante Express, a selection of courier agencies,
and IRNet, a credit union alternative to sending remittances that channels
money through Citibank.142 Since 2000, in addition to the money transfer
operations (MTO) which Orozco surveyed, “a new crop of options has
sprung up, offering more choices and often lower prices.”143 These new
options must compete with both formal and informal ways of remitting
money.144 In addition to the effect this has on hermanos lejanos, as Sarah
Gammage, an Economic Policy Institute research associate, recently
observed, “[t]he proliferation of remittance transfer agencies is also
changing the financial landscape in El Salvador.”145
The combined effect of these demand and supply changes has made
“sending money across borders . . . much cheaper and more accessible than
it used to be.”146 “[I]ncrease in competition in the remittance market has
resulted in a decrease in the cost of sending remittances from the United
States.”147 The U.S. Government Accountability Office continued in a
November 2005 report on remittances, “the average cost of sending $250
[to LAC countries] has fallen from 12.5 percent in 2003 to 7 percent in
2005.”148 Despite the report’s next sentence caveat that “price reductions
have leveled off recently,”149 this rapid change, arguably reflecting the
power of the invisible hand, deserves to be celebrated! As Donald Terry,
Manager of the Multilateral Investment Fund, stated in a San Francisco
142

141.

ATTRACTING REMITTANCES, supra note 141, at 3–9; Remittances and Markets, supra note

143
Carolyn Said, Remittance Market Draws Major Players: Banks, Cards, Credit Unions Enter
the Fray, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2006, at F3. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, in
November 2005, released a report that both updates Orozco and describes new remittances mechanisms
by type. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES: INFORMATION ON
PRODUCTS, COSTS, AND CONSUMER DISCLOSURES (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06204.pdf.
144
For a history and comparison of different global informal money transfer systems, see U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Discussion Paper: Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunities and
Challenges for Development Finance, 13, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2002/DP/26 (Nov. 2002) (prepared by
Leonides Buencamino & Sergei Gorbunov) [hereinafter Informal Money Transfer Systems]; see also
Sarah Gammage, Viajeros y Viajeras en El Salvador: Connecting Worlds, Cementing Ties (2003),
available at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~migrate1/ResearchPapers/GammageWorkingPaperNo.2.pdf
(discussing the informal couriers serving the Salvadoran community).
145
Gammage, supra note 34, at 8.
146
Patrick K. Barron, First Vice President and Chief Operation Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, Speech at the Sumaq Summit, International Business Strategies in Latin America: Lowering
Barriers to Cross-Border Payments (May 5, 2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.
cfm?objectid=5573C526-DDA4-D25C-A89690CFD9D07A37&method=display.
147
U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 143, at 22. Given the scale of remittance
sending, the amount saved through cost declines is also substantial. For Latin America these cost
reductions meant that the “amount saved in transfer fees in 2005 alone was approximately $5 billion—
far exceeding total foreign aid to the region that year.” INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at
5.
148
U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 143, at 23.
149
Id.
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Chronicle article, remittance “[c]osts used to be outrageous; now they’re
simply too high.”150
Market forces may lower remittance costs still further. As reported in
the Economist, “not so long ago banks steered clear of remittances . . . .
Today big banks, hungry for new growth areas, are clamouring to offer
wire-transfer services to immigrants.”151 Eager to attract new clients,
banks have even offered zero-cost remittance sending,152 a move which if
replicated across all the markets would undermine the claim—such as that
made in an English white paper on the topic—that, “the market for
remittance services is not working efficiently.”153 Tellingly, the English
white paper on remittances, after noting the remittance market inefficiency,
nevertheless concluded that “[c]ompetition amongst service providers is
the best way of reducing transactions costs.”154
B. Remittance Regulation
Before concluding that the market alone will adequately lower
remittance costs, it is worth exploring the government’s role in
determining remittance costs. At the 2004 Summit of the Americas of the
Organization of American States, “the presidents of the hemisphere
declared the need to reduce remittance transaction costs by 50 percent in
the next five years.”155 Such a declaration begs the question, what is the
proper role for government in tackling remittance costs? Even if it is
accepted that there is “lack of competition” in the remittance market and
that high costs “act as a type of regressive tax on international migrants,”156
it does not necessarily follow that government should actively seek to
lower remittance costs. The role of the state is complicated where
remittances are concerned because remittances, by definition, involve two
governments, and therefore, if the state is going to play a role in reducing
costs, “[c]ooperation between financial authorities in sending and recipient
150
Carolyn Said, Costs of Remittances Strains Latinos: Sending Cash to Relatives Back Home is a
Process Filled with Fees and Hassles, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2006, at F1; accord de Luna Martínez,
supra note 1, at 30 (“[F]ees paid by senders and recipients of remittances are still high.”).
151
Into the Fold: Americans Without Bank Accounts, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2006.
152
Id. (“Some banks try to woo the unbanked by offering free remittances.”). Banks that reach
out to remittance-sending communities are likely to find a client base with unmet needs for a wide
range of financial products, from home loans to insurance, that “financial institutions can take
advantage of.” OROZCO, supra note 41, at 18; see also Lima & Plastrik, supra note 112, at 1 (noting
that some observers argue that the remittance market could be “one way to draw immigrants into the
financial system”). For more on lowering barriers that the poor face in accessing financial services, see
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
153
HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 58.
154
Id. at 59.
155
MANUEL OROZCO, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/payments04/orozco.pdf.
156
Adams, Jr. & Page, supra note 39, at 1660.
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According to José de Luna Martínez:

Given the multiple components of remittances fees, it is
clear that efforts in developing (recipient) countries alone
will not be sufficient to address the high remittance costs that
senders and beneficiaries still pay. Efforts are needed in both
sending and receiving countries in order to bring down
remittance fees. A common approach and coordination
between authorities of sending and recipient countries is
needed to overcome factors that may hinder fees reduction,
such as low competition among service providers, poor
information disclosure for senders and recipients, poor
payment system infrastructure that discourage [sic] migrants
from using formal financial institutions to send money home,
restrictions for cross-border operations, lack of trust of
senders and recipients with financial institutions, etc.158
What is clear from de Luna Martínez’s call for coordination is that
remittance costs are impacted by a large number of policy choices and
implicitly that an isolated regulatory change will not be sufficient by itself.
Simple changes—such as allowing recipients to accept remittances in U.S.
dollars and hold them until they can find the best exchange rate rather than
being dependent on the remittance transfer operator159—are a start. So too
is encouraging those who have a stake in remittance costs to become
involved in helping ensure market strength is brought to bear on high-cost
remittance firms by educating remittance consumers of their options when
choosing how to send money to loved ones.160
157

de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 31.
Id. at 18.
According to Yoko Niimi & Çağlar Özden, “money transfer fees and the presence of dual
exchange rates reduce remittances.” Niimi & Özden, supra note 97, at 3 (reporting the results of a
study by Freund and Spatafora (2005)). By allowing recipients to hold U.S. currency, a market for
remittance currency exchange can be created; without such allowance, recipients are subject to
remittance operators setting exchange rates. See de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that
allowing U.S. currency to be held has been advocated by those looking for ways to lower remittance
costs but also noting that “in practice most developing countries already allow their citizens to open
accounts in U.S. dollars or any other major international currency”).
160
A number of initiatives aimed at low-income individuals outside the remittance context have
tried to reduce the amount the poor are paying for goods or services by providing low-income
purchasers with additional information in an effort to increase market transparency. Matt Fellowes,
Making Markets an Asset for the Poor, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 453 (2007). With remittances,
as José de Luna Martínez argues, NGO-driven education can be particularly important on the sending
side:
Because information is critical for competition in the marketplace, authorities,
but also NGOs in other developing countries could consider playing an active role in
collecting, comparing and disseminating information on a regular basis about the
fees of different money transfer products. This may help migrants—in particular
those that do not speak the language of their host country—to make better informed
choices.
158
159
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Overshadowing such piecemeal changes is the larger challenge of
balancing anti-money laundering, anti-terrorist finance goals with
appropriate and realistic regulation of remittance sending. Remittances
naturally raise concerns of money-laundering and even terrorism. Growing
awareness of the scale of remittance sending, and of the multitude of
mechanisms available to send remittances has raised concerns that besides
immigrants sending money to family members, others are using the same
channels to launder money or finance terrorist activities.161 In the wake of
9/11, the United States and other governments became more interested in
tracing international transactions and began cracking down directly or
indirectly (through banks) on informal remittance operations.162 Such
regulation threatens to not only raise market costs, but also to make
tracking small international monetary flows such as remittances harder, not
easier.163
Post-9/11 regulation and regulatory enforcement imposes a one size
(large) fits all model on licensed remittance operators, who are required to
keep costly records and be well capitalized.164 One perspective is that of
Donald Terry, Manager of the Multilateral Investment Fund at the InterAmerican Development Bank. Terry believes that the United States
“decided that we have to fight terror with error.”165 According to a survey
of formal sector remittance firms, regulations are having a negative effect
on their business:
The four largest obstacles to doing business are related to
the regulatory regime in the U.S., either directly or indirectly.
The largest problem is getting access to maintaining or
de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 19.
161
Such terrorism concerns need not correspond with true dangers; according to Mary De Ming
Fan, “[j]uxtaposing undocumented immigration with terrorism produces an illusory correlation,”
negatively effecting national policy towards immigrants. Mary De Ming Fan, The ImmigrationTerrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 33, 46 (2007).
162
Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 1 (noting that after 9/11 informal money
transfer systems “have come under intense scrutiny by domestic and international law enforcement
authorities”).
163
This dual danger of rising costs and remittances pushed to informal channels through
heightened regulations should not be overstated; paradoxically the post-9/11 regulations have been
coupled with simultaneous significant remittance price decreases. Nevertheless, even non-libertarians
should bear in mind presidential candidate Ron Paul’s written statement given at a recent House
remittances hearing: “[t]he worst thing Congress could do is intervene in an overly forceful manner and
undo all the good things that have been done so far.” Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market
Efficiency—A Progress Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 24
(2007) (opening statement of Rep. Ron Paul, Member, Subcomm. on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology) (submitted as a written statement).
164
Nikos Passas, Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas, in TERRORISM
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 21, 35 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).
165
Donald Terry, Remarks at American University Law Review’s 2007 Symposium: A World on
the Move: Legal Perspectives on a New Era of International Migration (Feb. 15, 2007) (notes on file
with author).
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opening accounts with U.S. banks. Banks are the only way
for remittance firms to access payment and settlement
systems and to maintain transaction accounts and as such a
crucial component in a remittance system.166
Such an industry position may not be surprising, but in this case may
not be that far from the mark. In a chapter entitled, “Terrorism Financing
Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” Nikos Passas argues American
“regulation is missing its target” because by imposing excessive regulatory
burdens, small corner stores and other informal remitters are forced
underground through this “de facto ‘criminalization’ of informal
remitters.”167
Remittance businesses typically collect money from
immigrants and disperse money either directly or indirectly through an
agent to recipients, doing so by grouping individual transfers using
business accounts in major banks. Directly, “[t]ighter regulations and
compliance with new anti-money-laundering legislation have raised MTO
costs of doing business.”168 Indirectly, money transfer organizations, also
face “a significant increase in the regulatory scrutiny of banks that provide
services to MTOs, [with] a growing number of banks . . . choosing not to
do business with MTOs rather than absorb the higher management costs
and increased risk.”169 When commercial banks lock out formal sector
remittance business accounts “in response to tight anti-money laundering
regulations and fear of bad publicity,”170 competition in the sector can
decline, harming remittance businesses and remittance senders.171
The greatest impact of heightened regulation may not be on price, but
on efforts to prevent terrorist financing and money laundering. The ability
of governments to identify and track suspicious international transactions
depends on those transactions taking place through channels the
government is monitoring.172 By raising the cost and hassle of sending
money through banks or licensed money transfer organizations, regulations
which are overly burdensome, drive remittance senders to use informal
166
OLE E. ANDREASSEN, REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW
REMITTANCE FIRMS OPERATE AND HOW THEY PERCEIVE THEIR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 9 (World
Bank Financial Sector Discussion Series, 2006) (survey excludes Western Union and Moneygram).
167
Passas, supra note 164, at 35.
168
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 8.
169
Id.; see also Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency—A Progress Report:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and
Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 6 (2002) (testimony of Tom Haider,
Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer Moneygram International) (citing the challenge of
securing and retaining a bank account as a “pressing issue” for remittance firms).
170
de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 24 n.19.
171
ANDREASSEN, supra note 166, at 15 (describing the “large efficiency loss due to the regulatory
regime” that can come from excessive regulation).
172
See Passas, supra note 164, at 35 (noting that regulations imposing “unmanageable burdens”
result in “evasion and non-compliance”).
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mechanisms which do not report their activities to regulatory agencies.173
As Nikos Passas describes, “unmanageable burdens for private entities or
the government agencies that regulate them” lead predictably to “evasion
and non-compliance.”174 Passas captures the idea that not only can
regulatory burdens be unmanageable for businesses, but also for the
agencies with oversight authority.175 There are alternatives: for example,
Passas suggests that “intelligence-led and risk-based” regulation and
enforcement, of the sort practiced by Great Britain, could improve
targeting “without driving everyone underground.”176 Intelligence-led
enforcement is particularly important given the impossibility of
“[a]pplying know-your-customer rules to millions of tiny [remittance]
transactions.”177 While a laissez-faire approach to the remittance market is
not appropriate, neither is an approach which undoes the market’s success
in lowering remittance costs.178
Those who support remittance-promoting policies—motivated by
poverty reduction or development potential, or simply fighting for the
rights of migrants to care for their loved ones—need to frame their
critiques of the current regulatory environment as a matter of degree and
implementation rather than a rejection of all oversight. Given the ease
with which money-launderers and terrorists (there are important
differences, but regulation is generally targeting both groups
simultaneously) can manipulate the “formal and informal global financial
system,”179 policymakers “arguably should refrain from over-committing
efforts to areas with diminishing returns.”180 According to a survey of
remittance organizations, there is “a strong dissatisfaction with what is
perceived as close oversight of formal remittance firms but no oversight or
173
See Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 8 (“Overly harsh government
interference in the remittance process could lead migrants to send a higher share of remittances through
informal channels, the opposite of the original initial intent.”); Andreassen, supra note 166, at 10 (“[I]f
being formal entails major obstacles to doing business, then informal competitors gain even more of an
advantage.”); HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 55 (“Migrants’ reasons for preferring informal
channels include considerations of cost, speed, ease of making and receiving the transfer, coverage
within the home country, and greater confidence and trust in the service provided.”).
174
Passas, supra note 164, at 35.
175
See INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that enforcement of legitimate
businesses wastes resources of regulators, raises business costs, and causes costs to rise for low-wage
immigrants sending remittances).
176
Passas, supra note 164, at 35.
177
The Importance of Remittances, supra note 7.
178
See Passas, supra note 164, at 21 (“Financial controls are an essential and indispensable
counter-terrorism tool . . . .”).
179
Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas, The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing, in
TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 7, 11 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds.,
2007).
180
Raphael Perl, Anti-Terror Strategy, The 9/11 Commission Report, and Terrorism Financing:
Implications for U.S. Policy Makers, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 247, 258
(Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007) (noting the “increasing financial and
technological sophistication of our adversaries and the multiplicity of fund transfer methods”).
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attempts to regulate informal firms, which is perceived to prevent a level
playing field and create a competitive disadvantage to the firms that are
appropriately licensed.”181 Industry dissatisfaction must be taken with a
grain of salt considering its self-serving nature. Nevertheless, overly
burdensome regulations can move the remittance market underground,182
imposing a range of costs on those families connected in part by
remittances.183
C. Taxation of Remittances
The greatest potential regulatory threat to remittances is remittance
taxation. Just as overly burdensome regulation of licensed remittance
firms can drive remitters to seek informal channels, taxation of
remittances, by either sending or receiving countries, would have the same
effect. Taxing remittances is attractive to politicians in sending countries
because such taxation targets “others” and not constituents.184 Proponents
of remittance taxation gloss over the many ways immigrants contribute to
the country where they work.185 They fail to see that such taxation does
not merely ensure immigrants pay their fair share for services and benefits
received from their, albeit somewhat reluctant, host country.186
1. Fiscal Impact of Immigrants
My focus is remittances and not taxation, but given the amount of
disinformation (and arguably xenophobia) regarding use of government
services by immigrants relative to their payment of taxes, unfortunately it
181

ANDREASSEN, supra note 166, at 10 (survey excludes Western Union and Moneygram).
Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 5 (arguing that regulatory deficiencies
such as “extensive government intervention” and “repressive financial policies” are the “primary
reasons for leakages from formal to informal channels”).
183
HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 60 (arguing, in the context of informal mechanisms,
that governments ought to “ensure that regulatory solutions are proportionate to the risks and sensitive
to the possible impacts on those who rely on remittances”).
184
Because the “others” in this case are often—but not always—non-citizen immigrants, taxes not
only can target “others” but also disfavored immigrants. Mary De Ming Fan, writing generally about
immigrant-targeted regulation, explains, “[i]n legislative dialogue, there is a danger that heuristics of
mistrust and fear will be deployed against those who are unrepresented or underrepresented because
there is not the typical voter check to induce more careful constructs.” De Ming Fan, supra note 161,
at 46.
185
See, e.g., Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement of Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez)
(“These people came here seeking a better way of life and, indeed, they are making life better for all of
us.”).
186
See, e.g., Brenda Walker, Should Immigrants Be Taxed?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at A19
(proposing a remittance tax to fund U.S. hospitals near the U.S.-Mexico border, arguing “[t]axing
remittances 10 percent to 15 percent per transaction would be fair because the cost would fall on those
who benefit”); see also Sue Kirchhoff, Immigration Debate Squeezes Some Businesses; Cities, States
Passing Rash of Laws on Illegal Aliens, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2007, at 1B (reporting on a remittance
tax proposal introduced before the Texas legislature under the theory that not raising such tax money
would not be “fair to everyone”).
182
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is worth briefly highlighting that immigrants do pay more than their fair
share. Professor Francine J. Lipman introduces her recent study on the
topic:
Many Americans believe that undocumented immigrants
are exploiting the United States economy. The widespread
belief is that “illegal aliens” cost more in government
services than they contribute to the economy. This belief is
demonstrably false. “[E]very empirical study of illegals’
economic impact demonstrates the opposite . . . :
undocumenteds actually contribute more to public coffers in
taxes than they cost in social services.”187
Later in the same article, after contrasting the many taxes
undocumented immigrants pay188 with legal limitations on the ability of
undocumented immigrants to take advantage of government programs
(which
the rest of us take for granted),189 Lipman observes,
“undocumented immigrants provide a fiscal windfall” to American
citizens.190 Lipman’s conclusions echo those of nearly every other study
that similarly concluded that the benefits to native-born Americans of
187
Lipman, supra note 29, at 1–2 (footnotes omitted) (quoting an earlier study by Peter L. Reich,
Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Laws Into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV.
219, 244–46 (1991)).
188
Lipman, supra note 29, at 5 (footnotes omitted) (“[E]ach year undocumented immigrants add
billions of dollars in sales, excise, property, income, and payroll taxes, including Social Security,
Medicare and unemployment taxes, to federal, state and local coffers. Hundreds of thousands of
undocumented immigrants go out of their way to file annual federal and state income tax returns.”); see
also Nina Bernstein, Tax Returns Rise for Immigrants in U.S. Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1
(explaining how undocumented immigrants without social security numbers can file taxes using IRS
assigned individual taxpayer numbers).
189
Lipman, supra note 29, at 5.
[U]ndocumented immigrants are barred from almost all government benefits,
including food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, federal
housing programs, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, Social
Security, Medicare, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Generally, the only
benefits federally required for undocumented immigrants are emergency medical
care, subject to financial and category eligibility, and elementary and secondary
public education.
Id. at 5–6.
190
Id. at 7. A study by the National Research Council is illustrative of the challenges involved in
accounting for the fiscal costs of immigrants: the study found an annual immigration fiscal impact of
$232 per native household. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 292 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds.,
1997). The study then noted the limitations of such annual snapshots, arguing that the study’s figures
should be adjusted because for “changing demographics” such as the fact that today’s children who
consume services will become taxpayers in the future. Id. at 294. The study ultimately concluded that
in the long-run current immigrants had an “overall positive” fiscal impact on the United States. Id. at
353. For a review of a number of fiscal impact studies, see GEORGES VERNEZ & KEVIN F. MCCARTHY,
THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION TO TAXPAYERS 5–18 (1996). See also Eduardo Porter, Illegal
Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security With Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005 at A1 (noting that
undocumented workers are “providing the [Social Security] system with a subsidy of as much as $7
billion a year”).
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191

immigration exceed the costs.
Therefore, though many Americans
believe that immigrants “use more social services than they pay for
through taxes,”192 given that this is a misconception, the argument that
sending-country remittance taxation is justified as a way to capture
otherwise unpaid tax obligations is not convincing.193
2. Remittance Taxation
A remittance tax imposed by sending countries would not be an
income tax, but would instead be analogous to cigarette or other “sin
taxes.” Such tax proposals seek to discourage or punish bad behavior, in
this case the choice to send remittances rather than spend money locally.
Yet, as a consumption tax, remittance taxation would be crude and
regressive, diminishing the ability of migrants to help provide support for
family members left behind. Given the qualitative difference between
typical products subject to “vice” taxes and remittances, anti-immigrant
sentiment probably explains taxing proposals more than supposed fairness
grounds for remittance consumption taxes.
The incentives for receiving countries to tax remittances are arguably
less problematic, though how such taxation is felt is similar. For recipient
countries with weak economies, it can be a challenge for governments to
identify sources of collectable tax revenue. Remittances that pass through
formal channels not only can be traced but, if taxed, can be collected
immediately upon the money entering the country. If the tax is seen as a
tax on recipients, then the government is taxing those who, depending on
the country, do have the power to voice their opposition politically. But
arguably, the incidence of a tax on remittance-receiving countries, like
taxes imposed on remittance sendering countries, would impose a tax on
those who may not have a meaningful vote in either their home country or
their new country.194 It is money earned by remittance senders that would
191
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, IMMIGRATION’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 1 (2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.pdf (concluding “that immigration has a
positive effect on the American economy as a whole and on the income of native-born American
workers,” adding as a key finding that “[c]areful studies of the long-run fiscal effects of immigration
conclude that it is likely to have a modest, positive influence”).
192
Eric S. Rothman & Thomas J. Espenshade, Fiscal Impacts of Immigration to the United States,
53 POPULATION INDEX 381, 381 (1992). It must be acknowledged that some studies suggest that
American intuition plays a role at a local level. Id. at 410 (“The results at the state level are more
mixed: some show immigrants are fiscal burdens; others indicate they are net benefits. Only at the
national level is there a paucity of evidence indicating that immigrants impose net costs on other
residents.”).
193
A focus on immigrant tax-take versus the fiscal expenditure risks obscures the many other
benefits immigrants provide the United States. See Doris Meissner et al., Immigration and America’s
Futures: A New Chapter, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 474–77 (2007) (citing the role of immigrants
filling labor market gaps, being entrepreneurial, helping with innovation and science).
194
Many countries do continue to afford emigrants the right to vote, but practical constraints such
as the cost of returning home (and the related cost of returning to the United States, especially if the
emigrant is an undocumented worker) limit voting by hermanos lejanos. For more on dual nationality,
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be taken by the tax, and to some extent remittances have fewer labor costs
to remittance-recipients. Thus, if senders and recipients are viewed as a
single family unit and the unit pays the tax, senders likely would “feel” and
“pay” such taxes more than their family members whose experience with
the tax would be more analogous to their limited experience with fees
imposed by remittance firms.
Remittance taxation would lead to a deliberate movement away from
formal channels towards informal remittance channels, regardless of
whether the tax is imposed by remittance-sending countries or remittancereceiving countries. Since taxation relies upon government knowledge of
remittance transactions, transactions that occur through unlicensed,
informal remitters would not be subject to remittance taxes, or rather, to
remittance tax collection.195 As is the case with burdensome regulation
generally, taxation driven “informalization” of the remittance transmitting
market would threaten to undo the progress that has been made in lowering
costs.
More fundamentally, proposals to tax remittances mischaracterize the
phenomenon, transforming remittances from what they are—“personal
flows of money from migrants to their friends and families”—to something
they should not be⎯a flow of money to be taxed or used only for specific
purposes by governments.196 When considering possible regulation of
remittances, whether accomplished by overly constrictive market rules or
by direct taxation, the starting point for “any constructive public policy or
program is acknowledgment of the private nature of these flows.”197
Unless there is acknowledgement of the private aspect of remittances, the
recently “discovered” scale and importance of remittance activity invites
rent-seeking by politicians, eager to score anti-immigrant points in sending
countries or to tax an observable revenue stream in receiving countries.
D. Concluding Regulatory Thoughts
Many goods and services are associated with known prices, or at least
with a relatively stable, and⎯critically⎯known range of acceptable prices.
see Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences
for Naturalization in the United States, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 997, 997 (2001). Despite practical
difficulties in voting, dual citizenship rights do serve to strengthen the tie between hermanos lejanos
and their home country. In close elections, those who can afford to and who have strong feelings about
the election outcome will return home to vote, and those who cannot afford to return often follow the
election results. See, e.g., Claudia Nuñez, Elecciones al Aire, EL DIARIO DE HOY, Mar. 21, 2004
(providing information for hermanos lejanos on how to follow the 2004 Presidential elections results).
195
While laws may require tax be paid on all remittances, regardless of mechanism, given limited
enforcement capabilities of most receiving countries, tax evasion and non-reporting would likely dwarf
voluntary reporting and hold down government collection (similar to the familiar problems in the
United States of under-reporting of tips or earnings from spot labor or from the informal economy).
196
Ratha, supra note 19, at 1.
197
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 4.
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Remittance transfer services have not yet reached that stage of market
definition, though market forces are driving firms towards a narrowing
band of acceptable charges for sending money to particular countries.
When I go to a Taco Bell in Cambridge, I expect to be charged roughly the
same as I would be charged by a Taco Bell in Durango, Colorado, and I
“know” I am not getting a good deal if the price of a bean burrito is above
one dollar.198 The same can be said for my purchases of socks, notebooks,
and even Ipods. Remittance costs are only beginning to take on a similar
characteristic. Given the market’s success since 2000 in driving down
transfer costs, it is premature to impose a solution to the still too high,
though much lower, costs.199 Remittances reflect a division between
earners from spenders, with the consumption taking place overseas. But,
the fact that consumption takes place overseas does not preclude the
benefit from reaching remittance-sending countries.200 Hermanos lejanos
and the rest of American society benefit, albeit in different ways, from the
income generated to send remittances, as well as the actual sending of
remittances. Consequently, while it is premature to seek a governmental
solution to lower remittance costs, now is the time to reject proposals to
heighten regulation or taxation of remittances.
IV. THE APPEAL AND LIMITS OF REMITTANCES
By demonstrating the potential of markets and by giving recognition to
the work of the poor, remittance scholarship and attention on remittances
escapes easy identification as being essentially the domain of
“conservative” or “liberal” politicians or academics. The same can be said
198
For the role of retailers in helping to establish perceptions regarding appropriate pricing of
goods, see CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT 115−16 (2006) (arguing that Wal-Mart, by
deeply discounting their sales relative to independent dealers, changes our understanding of the proper
price of a lawn mower).
199
Information gaps are likely to allow the greatest room for upward pricing by remittance
businesses located in areas where immigrant populations are lower. For example, a city such as New
Orleans with a sizable Honduran population may have low cost mechanisms available, known to the
community for sending money to Honduras. However, smaller immigrant communities from other
countries in the same city may know and share less about inexpensive mechanisms and consequently
may have to pay more to send money home. Efforts by government entities and non-profits to
disseminate comparative cost information to immigrant communities can be valuable when the
community is too small to accomplish this independently.
200
Professor Raquel Aldana observes that remittance money spent in El Salvador might not be
that different from money spent in the United States to the extent that remittance-based purchases are
of U.S. products; in such cases, the trickle down purchase effect flows in part to the recipient country
and in part to the sending country. Email from Raquel Aldana to author (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file with
Connecticut Law Review); see also GHOSH, supra note 2, at 78 (noting that when remittances entail
“conspicuous consumption, with excessive expenditure on foreign luxury products and sophisticated
household appliances to show off the newly found wealth, this may not only contribute to social
division but may also lend an enhanced prestige value to foreign products, alongside a psychological
downgrading of domestic goods”). But see Torrisi, supra note 30, at 130 (arguing that “[r]emittances
are recycled within the local economy in El Salvador”).
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201

of micro-lending and land-titling initiatives.
Navigating around
ideological capture paradoxically risks coloring our view of remittances in
a way that wrongly elevates remittances from what they represent⎯a way
for immigrants to reduce the effects of poverty on distant family
members⎯to what we want remittances to be, a path to development. A
first step in properly contextualizing remittances is to resist the first-world
capture of remittance dialogue threatening to transform our understanding
of remittances from an economic phenomenon of transnational families
into a form of North-South development aid.202
A South-North
orientation,203 rather than a Washington down approach, prioritizes the
lived experiences of those communities most dependent on and affected by
remittances, who rely on unimpeded transfers.204 Understanding how
remittances fit into “chastened neoliberalism,” characteristic of current law
and development thought, helps explain the rhetorical success that
remittance advocates have had.205 However, the price of remittance
emphasis is not minimal; focusing on remittances alone risks overlooking
the many background rules (from immigration law to employment
practices to gendered relations) that drive remittance practices. Finally,
global development requires more from both sending and receiving
countries than merely reaping remittance benefits.
The work remittances do lessening the effects of poverty for recipient
families in the developing world relies upon a more fluid global labor
market than is formally incorporated in our immigration law. Even as we
applaud the ability remittances have to provide resources to those who
need them, we must not turn a blind eye to the development stagnation of
many remittance-recipient countries. American responsibility to help with
the development of the third-world is not and will not be met through
remittances. The same can be said with regard to developing countries and
the responsibilities that their governments bear. Indeed, full recognition of
the role of remittances for developing countries may require remittance
201
See, e.g., Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Giving the Poor Some Credit: Microloans are in Vogue.
Are They a Sound Idea?, 14 AM. PROSPECT, May 2003, at A19, available at http://www.prospect.
org/cs/articles?article=giving_the_poor_some_credit (noting that microcredit “is one of those ideas that
attracts both liberals and conservatives”).
202
Although perhaps altruistically motivated, policy analysts and politicians arguably seek
advancement by transforming remittance knowledge into the language and culture of developed
countries without giving proper credit to the wealth of relevant experience possessed by remittance
receiving countries.
203
A South-North orientation might be overly optimistic, but arguably it would be an
improvement to “face” South and “open” up the conversation to include those from the South. See
Lucie White, On the Guarding of Borders, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 186 (1998) (arguing for
opening up the dialogue with those outside our borders in the immigration context).
204
By locating the remittance dialogue in countries such as El Salvador, the Philippines, and
Haiti, a presumption in favor of open remittance channels is established, enabling recipient countries
and transnational families to more effectively draw upon human rights and equitable principles to resist
the tax and regulatory interests of sending countries.
205
See infra notes 238–62 and accompanying text.
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isolating mechanisms. Otherwise, there is a danger that remittances will
allow politicians in the developing world to avoid the hard choices that
national level development requires.
Looking forward, as the remittance phenomenon moves from being a
favorite topic in development circles to being a focus of political and legal
attention, the existing structure of rules and practices that have enabled the
growth in remittances will undoubtedly change. In a globalizing world,
this change will take place, and, as it does, it is important not to miss the
opportunities presented by the phenomenon. Policies should respect and
emulate the love transnational families demonstrate with their remittances;
this means, at the most basic level, enabling and facilitating remittances.
But, more ambitiously, it means seeing remittances as an aspect of the
relationship between the developed and developing world, but not as the
way for the developed world to satisfy its geo-political and moral
obligations to the developing world.206 Remittances ultimately reflect the
love that transnational families have despite the barriers and hardships they
face, not because of American policies. Because remittances are an antipoverty tool and not the route to development, we must do more to meet
the obligations of love inherent in the recognition of our shared humanity
with those who struggle with underdevelopment.
A. The Appeal
Remittance advocates—scholars, politicians, and a number of nonprofits—do more than study remittances—they “help to define”
remittances and remittance potential.207 Such advocates have succeeded in
appealing “both to proponents of neoliberal economic policies and to
analysts and advocates interested in grass-roots empowerment.”208 By
advocating a “third way” approach between welfarism and remorseless
capitalism,209 remittance advocates have managed to get bipartisan support
for their work and for their policy proposals.210 Yet there is danger, rarely
206
In 1970, Nobel laureate Gunner Myrdal wrote, “commercial and financial policies of the
developed countries toward the underdeveloped countries are, like all other crucial policy problems, at
bottom a moral issue.” GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY 310 (1970).
207
Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 186.
208
Id. at 192 (emphasis omitted).
209
Id. (internal citations omitted).
210
As the National Council of La Raza acknowledged in a 2005 brief on remittances, Republicans
and Democrats have both introduced pro-remittance legislation, supporting a 2004 commitment made
by President Bush to lower remittance costs. BEATRIZ IBARRA, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA,
REFORMING THE REMITTANCE TRANSFER MARKET 2 (2005), available at http://www.
nclr.org/content/publications/detail/31291. Additionally, the Federal Reserve has gotten involved in
remittances through both the Mexico-U.S. Automated Clearinghouse System and by giving banks
Community Reinvestment Act credit for reaching out to remittance senders. See Elizabeth McQuerry
(Fed. Res. Retail Payments Office); Opportunities & Obstacles for Banks in Remittance Market
(Powerpoint presented at Florida International University, June 4, 2005) (on file with Connecticut Law
Review); Press Release, U.S. Rep. Joe Baca’s Office, Rep. Baca Seeks CRA Credit for Financial
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acknowledged by advocates, that the fetishization of remittance studies
will inspire exaggerated accounts of the scope of remittance sending and of
the poverty alleviation and development potential of these money flows.
Given the popularity of remittances, as shown by the profusion of
remittance conferences, reports, and publications, a natural question to ask
is whether this popularity is based on fundamental principles or on
misleading characterizations and exaggerations.
Perhaps the best way to answer this question is by considering two
economic ideas—micro-lending and land-titling—that entered the spotlight
before remittances. Appreciation of micro-lending, land-titling, and now
remittance effects crosses ideological lines. All three draw their strength
from capitalism and depend on regulatory changes, gaining the support of
conservatives leery of programs that smack of global welfarism.
Neoliberals love that micro-lending, land-titling, and remittances
originated not from Washington, D.C. but from bankers, intellectuals, and
families of the developing world.211 By empowering the poor, or stated
differently, by recognizing the dynamic potential located in the poor
themselves, these economic activities escape the usual political traps that
derail standard anti-poverty measures such as development aid. Now that
the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund receive external and internal skepticism from anti-poverty
and international growth advocates, models of growth that do not rely upon
large Washington-led institutions resonate.
1. Proven Rhetoric: Microcredit and Land-titling
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the 2006 Nobel Peace
Prize for “their efforts to create economic and social development from
below.”212 Yunus, and the Grameen Bank which he founded, extended
very small loans to groups of women in Bangladesh, lifting more than half
of all borrowers out of poverty.213 By showing that the poor could repay
uncollateralized loans and that a bank serving the poor could turn a profit,
the Grameen Bank captured the imagination of the many who wanted the
Services Institutions Offering Remittance Services (June 4, 2004) (on file with Connecticut Law
Review).
211
See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Why the West has
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 217 (2005)
[hereinafter Reflections in a Distant Mirror] (noting that international interest in micro-lending “might
seem encouraging” to “those who had always thought that the ‘First World’ could learn a few things
from the ‘Third World’”).
212
Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Chairman, Nor. Nobel Comm., Presentation Speech for the 2006 Nobel
Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/
presentation-speech.html.
213
Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2006, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006),
available at http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lect_2006b.html. For more on Yunus’ formation of the
Grameen Bank and the bank’s growth, see MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICROLENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 117−30 (2003).
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poor to be able to participate in market economy without having to
continually provide welfare payments.214 As Professor Rashmi DyalChand reports, micro-lending or microcredit, “enchanted” development
communities, politicians, and the media.215 One reporter noted, “Yunus
has pulled off the remarkable feat of appealing to policymakers across the
political spectrum. There has hardly been a murmur of dissent. Yunus
must be the most widely admired moneylender in history.”216
Microcredit has been tried in a number of countries and has been the
subject of countless academic studies, many of them critical.217 A reliance
on women’s networks of jointly responsible borrowers is a characteristic of
many microcredit operations, a feature seen by some as empowering
women and by others as doing the opposite.218 Part of the attraction of
solidarity lending practices that spread responsibility among borrowers is
its “bottoms-up” model.219 Yet, there are reasons for concern. First, for
microcredit to be successful, borrowers have to be supported by a market
for their goods, and that might not always exist.220 Additionally,
microcredit program take-up and success differs across countries.221
Microcredit program growth is constrained by limited donor and perhaps
214
See Reflections in a Distant Mirror, supra note 211, at 230 (describing support for the
importation of the micro-lending model to U.S. inner cities by members of the Community Economic
Development movement); see also Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank at a Glance (May. 2008),
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175
(last
visited July 29, 2008) (providing an overview of Grameen Bank activities).
215
Reflections in a Distant Mirror, supra note 211, at 220. Grameen Bank microloans were even
featured in Gerry Trudeau’s Doonesbury on May 13, 2007. The comic can be viewed at
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=182&Itemid=199. For
more on microcredit, see Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist
Morality of Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85 (2002).
216
Tom Bethell, Micro Man, AM. MAG., May–June 2007, http://www.american.com/archive/
2007/may-june-magazine-contents/micro-man (last visited July 29, 2008).
217
See Jonathan Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569, 1569 (1999)
(surveying the literature and comparing different countries’ experiences).
218
Compare Rachel Errett Figura, Note, An End to Poverty Through Microlending: An
Examination of the Need for Credit by Poor, Rural Women and the Success of Microlending Programs,
8 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 157, 169−70 (2002) (“[M]icrocredit development programs have
an empowering effect on women . . . [and] old repressive, patriarchal ways become less relevant.”),
with Farhad Hossain, Small Loans, Big Claims, 13 DEV. IN PRACTICE 414, 414 (2003) (reporting on
studies finding that Grameen Bank lending is associated not with empowerment of women in
Bangladesh but with domestic abuse and gender conflict).
219
Morduch, supra note 217, at 1570; accord Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the Mechanics of
Solidarity Lending: Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract Structure, 9 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 206 (1999). But see Michael Woolcock, Social Capital and Economic
Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework, 27 THEORY AND SOC’Y 151,
183−84 (1998) (contrasting the “bottom-up” nature of rotating savings and credit associations versus
the “top-down” nature of group-based microfinance institutions such as the Grameen bank).
For an analysis of the design components that determine the success of differing solidarity
programs, see Denise Anthony, Cooperation in Microcredit Borrowing Groups: Identity, Sanctions,
and Reciprocity in the Production of Collective Goods, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 496 (2005).
220
Martha Brant, Where Credit is Due, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1997 (reporting on the concerns of
microcredit “agnostics”).
221
Id.
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222

capital dollars.
Most fundamentally, even in Bangladesh, Yunus’ home
country, microcredit has only had a “modest effect on lowering aggregate
poverty rates,” and the country “remains persistently and acutely poor.”223
While he has yet to win a Nobel Prize, Peruvian economist Hernando
de Soto seems destined to receive one for recognizing the power that
granting formal rights, such as land title to the poor, could have on the
poor.224 Through his non-profit, Instituto Libertad y Democracia, de Soto
asserts that poor countries ought to formalize the property held by the poor
and that doing so will enable them to “pull themselves out of poverty.”225
Formal property has many advantages over informal property—such as the
ability to obtain loans tied to such property226—that mean, according to de
Soto and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that “when
governments grant people legal means to control their assets, they
empower them to invest and plan for their future.”227 At the heart of de
Soto’s push for land titling is the idea that “after some initial governmental
intervention in the form of registration of property rights, the market will
solve the market failures that prevent the poor from accumulating
wealth.”228 Institutions ranging from The Economist to Yale University to
222

Mark Sappenfield & Mark Trumbull, Big Banks Find Little Loans a Nobel Winner, Too,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 16, 2006, at 1 (noting that the shortfall in donor dollars requires the
involvement of the capital markets in microcredit work).
223
Howard Kargar et al., The Challenge of Community Work in a Global Economy, 34 J. SOC. &
SOC. WELFARE 69, 77 (2007).
224
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact
of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 59–62 (2007) (noting that de Soto has already been considered
for a Nobel Prize). Though here I focus on land-titling, de Soto’s work more broadly pushes for
formalization of other informal work of the poor. See Jane Kaufman Winn, How to Make Poor
Countries Rich and How to Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1992) (reviewing HERNANDO DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989)).
225
Instituto Libertad y Democracia website, http://ild.org.pe/en/home (last visited July 29, 2008)
(according to which the Mission of the ILD is: “To provide governments with the technical
assistance—and the local capacity—to furnish all their citizens with the crucial legal tools to gain
access to the market and thus pull themselves out of poverty: inclusive property systems to hold and
leverage their assets, legal forms to organize their businesses, devices to identify themselves and
operate in expanded markets.”). See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (demonstrating that an
inability to produce capital can prevent a country from enjoying the benefits of capitalism).
226
See DE SOTO, supra note 225, at 49–62 (listing six effects of formal property: “Fixing the
Economic Potential of Assets,” “Integrating Dispersed Information into One System,” “Making People
Accountable,” “Making Assets Fungible,” “Networking People,” and “Protecting Transactions”).
227
Madeleine Albright & Hernando de Soto, Giving the Poor Their Rights, TIME., July 5, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640435,00.html.
228
Dyal-Chand, supra note 224, at 62. The irony should not be lost: by converting informal title,
which the poor acquired most often by ignoring formal title (through adverse possession), into formal
title, the poor are supposed to acquire greater ownership security. See Christopher Woodruff, Review
of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 1215, 1218 (2001) (asking whether such
systematic recognition of adverse possession might not lead to an increase in invasions of property).
By not paying attention to the uncompensated nature of the redistribution inherent in his ideas, de Soto
opens his land-titling proposal to criticism. See Gary D. Libecap, Book Review, 61 J. ECON. HIST.
1166, 1168 (2001) (reviewing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)).
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The Cato Institute have bestowed awards upon de Soto, and de Soto and
the ILD have been praised by world leaders ranging from Ronald Reagan
to Vicente Fox to Kofi Annan.229 Tellingly, Bill Clinton described de
Soto’s work as “[o]ne of the most promising anti-poverty initiatives in the
world.”230
Unfortunately, in many ways de Soto’s ideas regarding the power of
land-titling to empower the poor and to in turn spur development have not
lived up to their hype. Titling has not opened up private credit markets to
the poor who earlier had only informal title to their property.231 Credit
itself is but a precondition of the larger goal of meaningful investmentdriven income made possible by the formalization of title; without such
investment, many of the supposed advantages of titling will not
materialize.232 And of course, despite the promise that “the key to
prosperity lies in . . . unlocking hidden wealth that already exists,” land
titling does not help those who did not have informal rights to property to
begin with, therefore, disregarding the most poor.233 Although in 2001 the
Economist supported the idea that developing countries could solve their
poverty by following de Soto’s advice, by 2006 the magazine
acknowledged that “although land titling is certainly a good thing, it does
not provide a single theory of development.”234 The problem with de
229

See Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Awards, http://ild.org.pe/recognition/awards (listing
awards de Soto has received); Instituto Libertad y Democracia, World Leader Recognition webpage,
http://ild.org.pe/en/image/tid/14 (listing recognition de Soto has received).
230
William J. Clinton, Remarks to the World Congress on Information Technology, Adelaide,
Austl. (Feb. 27, 2002), transcript available at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/022702-ts-cf-gn-gl-austs-remarks-to-world-congress-on-information-technology. For more on the potential of de Soto’s ideas,
see Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the Potential to Deepen
Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761 (2006) (highlighting the role land-titling can play in deepening
democracy, with an emphasis on Peru’s experience); Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land As an
Intervention Against Urban Poverty in Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109 (2004)
(providing a review of the literature and focusing on land titling in urban areas).
231
Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban
Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program 2, 6 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf
(reporting on lending to those who received formal property titles through a Peruvian land-titling
program, based on a survey of 536 program participating households and 1180 households in the
control group).
232
Woodruff, supra note 228, at 1219; see also Jonathan Manders, Note, Sequencing Property
Rights in the Context of Development: A Critique of the Writings of Hernando de Soto, 37 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 177, 193 (2004) (contrasting de Soto’s expectations regarding property owners’ use of their
property with the observation that Latin American property owners “have routinely hoarded the wealth
yielded by their property”); Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor:
Effects of Land Titling (Aug. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/Galiani_022706.pdf (finding limited effects of an example of
Argentinean land-titling on access to credit and no effects on labor income).
233
Jeremy Clift, Hearing the Dogs Bark: Jeremy Clift Interviews Development Guru Hernando de
Soto, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2003, at 8, 10.
234
Of Property and Poverty; Development, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2006. But see No Title: Want
to Make the Poor Less Poor? Give Them Proper Title to What They Own, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001
(presenting a celebratory account of de Soto’s ideas).
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Soto’s land-titling idea is not the idea itself, but the pervasive “notion that
the key to progress can be found in one factor of development.”235 Despite
de Soto’s effort to make property rights “the center of everything,” his
“silver bullet” theory of development through land-titling strains reality.236
2. Concerns Regarding the Sell
The uncritical political and intellectual acclaim microcredit and landtitling received helped pave the way for the global development
community’s similarly enthusiastic reaction to remittances. Over the last
ten years, remittances boomed, costs fell, and migrants made use of formal
transfer mechanisms. Remittance advocates similarly have benefited as
opportunities to present their work, and funding for such work, have
expanded over the same period with international organizations choosing
to focus on remittances. Given the powerful role remittances have on
recipient countries and the importance of remittances for transnational
families, only the most cynical academic would engage in “remittance
critique,” right?
Perhaps, but let me nevertheless explore one concern I have—the
potential crowding-out effect of remittances. Remittance fixation and
cross-ideological celebration threatens to have a crowding-out effect on
calls for other anti-poverty efforts, especially efforts that demand more
radical change. After all, if through remittances the poor can help
themselves, do we really need to concern ourselves with their poverty? In
her study of de Soto’s work on asset formalization of the poor, Professor
Dyal-Chand concludes by asking, “Is de Soto naïve about the complexities
of poverty alleviation or sophisticated in his engagement with the
Washington Consensus?”237 I have the same question regarding remittance
advocates.
B. Chastened Neoliberal Thought
Remittance advocates have succeeded to a remarkable extent in
elevating the study and by focusing on remittances by powerful
institutions.238 The rhetoric employed by savvy advocates arguably
explains the reception remittances have enjoyed, but to understand that, it
is important to know the audience. Current law and development thinking
235
Manders, supra note 232, at 179 (critiquing de Soto’s proposal as relying on an overly
simplistic view of development).
236
Robert J. Samuelson, The Spirit of Capitalism, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 205, 208 (2001) (reviewing
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)); accord Manders, supra note 232, at 198 (arguing that “by holding
property rights as the key to progress rather than simply a factor in development, [de Soto] exaggerates
their true importance”).
237
Dyal-Chand, supra note 224, at 109.
238
See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
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has been characterized as “chastened neoliberalism” by Professor David
Kennedy.239 “Chastened” policy makers continue to rely upon neoliberal
market notions to form their “baseline common sense,” but they now
recognize that “[o]ne size does not—or need not—fit all.”240 The “retreat
from one-size-fits-all neo-liberalism,” according to Professor Kennedy, led
to an emphasis on understanding development through particularities,
which has made institutions and institutionalism central.241 Professor
Kennedy credits Amartya Sen with best articulating the normative
perspective of the current law and development mainstream. Sen argues
that governments “should avoid limiting freedom—by violating human
rights or obstructing markets—but should also aim to expand human
freedom, by providing security and promoting the fulfillment of basic
human needs.”242 Though this perspective seems to break new ground
from plain vanilla neoliberalism (sometimes referred to as the Washington
Consensus), with its sole focus on maximization of economic performance
or efficiency,243 laissez-faire law and development ideas have not
disappeared.
The “softer gentler development” ideas that have coalesced into a sort
of “muddy consensus,” as described by Professor Kennedy,244 are
struggling to develop the intellectual tools needed to resist market-centered
ideologies. Thus when the World Bank incorporated institutionalism into
its 2002 World Development Report, the focus and the potential for
reversion was clear from the title, Building Institutions for Markets.245 As
239
David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 150–66 (David M. Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Political Choices].
240
Id. at 150, 154.
241
David Kennedy, ‘Laws and Developments,’ in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING
COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 18 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kerraris eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Laws and Developments].
242
Political Choices, supra note 239, at 157. Kennedy bases his summary, quoted above, on
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). Sen’s capabilities approach was explicitly made
the basis for the World Bank’s conception of poverty in 2000. See Asuncion Lera St. Clair, How Can
Human Rights Contribute to Poverty Reduction? A Philosophical Assessment of the Human
Development Report 2000, in INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW: AN EMERGING DISCOURSE, supra note
9, at 14, 21–27 (discussing Sen’s views contained in the Report); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at v (2000), available at http://hdr.undp.
org/en/media/hdr_2000_en.pdf (crediting Sen with providing the “conceptual framework for the
Report”); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 15 (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/
WDR/English-Full-Text-Report/ch1.pdf (explaining that the report’s “broader approach to deprivation,
by giving a better characterization of the experience of poverty, increases our understanding of its
causes”).
243
Political Choices, supra note 239, at 129. For a definitional overview of the Washington
Consensus, see the Center for International Development at Harvard’s Global Trade Negotiations
Home Page overview, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.
244
Laws and Developments, supra note 241, at 19.
245
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS
(2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/. Though the 2002 report focuses on
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the tension in the 2002 World Development Report’s focus attests, law and
development thinking seems to be proceeding down a similar (thin?) path
President George W. Bush walked in his 2000 Presidential campaign when
he popularized the notion of “compassionate conservatism.”246 In 2001,
Professor Peter Edelman asked “[d]oes compassionate conservatism have a
heart?”247
The same question could be asked of compassionate
neoliberalism. According to Professor Kerry Rittich, the answer is “yes” . .
. and “no.”
Introducing it as “[o]ne of the most significant events in the field of
development in recent years,” Professor Rittich describes the change in
thinking on law and development as an “effort to incorporate social
concerns into the mainstream agenda of market reform and economic
development.”248 Like Professor Kennedy, Professor Rittich credits
Amartya Sen with much of the change in thinking249 and argues the
“inclusion of the social” has sufficiently progressed so that it “has now
been substantially normalized within the frame of development.”250
Professor Rittich switches gears however by noting that rhetorical changes
need not necessarily translate into new development strategies, implicitly
suggesting that the social may still have a ways to go before it is
meaningfully integrated with, or changes, the “old (and enduring)
imperative of promoting economic growth.”251 Though Sen’s suggestion
that states should pay attention to freedom and human fulfillment served as
intellectual fuel for rhetorically distinguishing “chastened neoliberalism”
from earlier law and development thinking,252 Professor Rittich writes that
“despite the inclusion of the social . . . the conception of the State’s role
has not fundamentally shifted.”253 Professor Rittich observes, “the fact that
the development agenda has been reformulated to include the social is
institutions supportive of markets, developing countries have a lengthy history of attempting to
structure markets in ways that help the poor. See Pranab Bardhan, Efficiency, Equity and Poverty
Alleviation: Policy Issues in Less Developed Countries, 106 ECON. J. 1344, 1345 (1996) (“[T]he
governments in many poor countries have heavily interfered in the market in the name of helping the
poor.”).
246
For sympathetic perspectives on compassionate conservatism, see MARVIN OLASKY,
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, AND HOW IT CAN TRANSFORM
AMERICA (2000); Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Compassionate Conservatism (Apr. 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/04/20020430.html.
247
Peter Edelman, Poverty & Welfare: Does Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, 64
ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2001).
248
Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199, 199 (2004) (focusing primarily on how social
concerns have been incorporated by international finance institutions).
249
Id. at 202.
250
Id. at 203.
251
Id. at 203–04.
252
See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.
253
Rittich, supra note 248, at 234.
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almost completely unreflected in the core legal and institutional reform
project.”254
1. An Idea with a Ready Audience
Remittances arguably fall within the space separating socially
inclusive rhetoric and market-centered traditional neoliberal reforms, a
positioning that, given the audience, helps explain the attention being paid
to remittances. Such “touchy, feely capitalism with a heart” positioning is
shared by microcredit and land-titling.255 Politicians get excited by
proposals that offer “the prospect of alleviating poverty while providing
incentives to work” and that reflect a shared “general suspicion of ongoing
subsidization.”256 By originating out of the poor and owing their power to
the long-distance connections between separated family members,
remittances feel socially inclusive.257 Quite literally, remittances bridge the
North-South divide,258 efficiently delivering needed support to family
members who rely upon income generated in more developed countries.259
Remittance advocates seek to highlight that, in line with current
mainstream law and development thought, remittances involve both the
social and the economic agendas of sending and receiving countries.
Rhetorically, remittances are interesting, and, better yet, from a political
popularity perspective, improving on them does not seem to require a shift
away from the old focus of ensuring a laissez-faire capitalist structure and
preventing government interference in these familial transfers. If Professor
Kennedy is right that law and development is in an era of “chastened
neoliberalism,” then remittances seem to allow policy makers to return to
their common-sense, market-friendly approaches.260 At the risk of

254

Id. at 224.
Madeleine Bunting, Fine Words, Flawed Ideas: Economist Hernando de Soto Is Hailed as a
Saviour of Poor Countries. But He Is Nothing of the Kind, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2000
(discussing de Soto and arguing that his ideas have benefitted from “semi-hysterical spinning”).
256
Morduch, supra note 217, at 1570 (focusing on the support microfinance has received).
257
Microcredit enjoys this same advantage: “[m]icrocredit programs are a paradigm example of a
trickle up approach to poverty alleviation and . . . . are extremely popular . . . [among] the development
community.” Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 303, 317 (2002).
258
According to Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “[t]he most important social problem facing
humanity at the beginning of the 21st century is the yawning divide in standards of living between the
rich nations of the global North and the poor nations of the global South.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 371, 371 (2004).
259
As Professor Williams writes: “Anti-poverty legal policies are not generally formulated within
a transnational perspective . . . . It is by now clear, however, given the steady integration of the world
economy, that poverty cannot (if it ever could) be understood, let alone contested, solely within
national borders.” Williams, supra note 9, at 2 (identifying the transnational aspect of poverty as one
of two reasons for expanding the boundaries of poverty law discourse).
260
That market driven “common sense” gives social welfare a secondary position is nothing new.
See Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help
255

52

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

sounding trite, remittances as social and economic institutional policy
allow merely “chagrined neoliberalism” to stand in for more meaningful
socially inclusionary policies.
Remittances seem to have notable rhetorical advantages over
alternative development or poverty solutions: they fit with notions of
neoliberal capitalism that emphasize a minimal role of the state and the
power of people acting independently to improve their own situation.
Rather than being “top-down,” with the industrialized countries providing
direct foreign aid, remittances seem to promise that things will work out if
the state sets up the right institutions and gets out of the way. Such a
limited role for the state, contained for example in this paper’s advocacy to
restrict regulations that unduly target remittances, resonates powerfully
given the baseline common-sense acceptance of capitalism as the primary
development tool.261 Post-Reagan and especially post–Soviet Union, ideas
which rely upon the power of the market—here the power of the poor to
help themselves if given the opportunity—seem to benefit from the sense
of inevitable improvement characteristic of societal views of capitalism.262
Remittances can be viewed as either a transnational extension of first
world capitalism’s benefits to distant, needy, family members or as a form
of transformative development. But this either/or perspective exists
precisely because of the power that the ideology of capitalism has to erase
the distinguishing marks of potentially divergent activities such as
remittances, that bridge “[t]he great distance that exists between the lives
of the poor and the abstract world of economic theory.”263 In the same
way, the troubling effects of remittance-focused development are swept
aside and remittance practice is characterized as a reaffirmation of
neoliberal capitalist development.
Remittances are a reflection of global inequality and, by being
generated only through hardships experienced by transnational families,
differ in significant respects from traditional development efforts focused
on particular nations.264 Compelled by necessity rather than choice, many
immigrants violate formal immigration laws, putting their lives at risk as
Developing Countries?, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 767, 781 (arguing that lawyers “will respond to market
forces by gravitating” away from “social welfare” and towards “unity” and “industrialization”).
261
See supra notes 154–97 and accompanying text.
262
Land-titling is a clear example of this: de Soto’s “appeal lies in large part because he doesn’t
challenge the status quo; he accepts capitalism is the only economic system on offer.” Bunting, supra
note 255; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief History of Global
Capitalism, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 90 (1999) (discussing the rise of global capitalism and
dismissing the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler and Stalin as improbable historical accidents).
263
Muhammad Yunus, Alleviating Poverty Through Technology, 282 SCI. 409, 409 (discussing
his own recognition of this distance in Bangladesh’s 1974 famine).
264
For an introduction to global inequality, measurement issues, and its importance, see Branko
Milanovic, Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters, in FLAT WORLD, BIG GAPS:
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 1, 1 (Jomo K.S. & Jacques
Baudot eds., 2007).
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they clandestinely travel north and enter a society that denies them the
most basic of citizenship rights.265
Local “get tough on illegal
immigration” measures force those who had begun to form a life in one of
the states to move even though the state is itself dependent on immigrant
labor.266 Husbands are separated from their wives and vice versa, children
grow up without their parents or take on grave risks in traveling north to
reunite with loved ones.267 The familial costs of separation differ across
families and across genders, making it impossible to define a single set of
transnational family experiences, other than perhaps a denial of what
should be basic rights: the right to return to see a loved one when they are
sick, the right to be able to leave work to visit family during holidays, the
right to be seen as a contributor rather than a parasite.268 If remittances are
going to be celebrated, rightly or wrongly, then remittance policy needs to
account for, and hopefully diminish, these human costs.
2. The Alternative(s)
What would an alternative look like? For those who ascribe to the
current socially inclusive orthodoxy, the alternative is indeterminate. In
their introduction to The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical
Appraisal, Professors David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos note that all but
one of the essays presented in their collection discuss, albeit using diverse
terminology, what they label as the “Third Moment” in law and
development.269 The indeterminacy of the Third Moment, Professors
Trubek and Santos explain, is a consequence of the doctrine embracing
“broad notions” that encompass “a great range of options.”270 The
265
See, e.g., JIMMY BRESLIN, THE SHORT SWEET DREAM OF EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ (2002)
(portraying one anonymous immigrant’s hardships and eventual death from a work accident).
266
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of Flight by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2008 (discussing the effect tough immigration enforcement is having on Arizona’s economy).
267
See, e.g., NAZARIO, supra note 111 (vividly portraying such separations and hardship through
the story of one family).
268
In this Article, I focus on family rather than gender-specific costs. One could come up with
gendered accounts of remittance effects, pointing to hardships women face when their men leave them
for another country, and inevitably some of these observations would be true for some groups of
transnational families.
See Sarah J. Mahler, Transnational Relationships: The Struggle to
Communicate Across Borders, 7 IDENTITIES 583, 585 (2001) (using the fact that men can withhold
remittance payments to punish infidelity of wives left in El Salvador and that women’s actions are
policed by neighbors, gender does not work neutrally in transnational communication, rather it
“exacerbates existing asymmetries between men and women”). But given the diversity of remittance
experiences, for example, whether typically men emigrate or women emigrate, gendered accounts are
bound to have powerful counter-narratives, and I leave it to others to more fully explore the gender
aspects of remittances.
269
David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 239, at 1, 8 n.3 (identifying “chastened
neoliberalism,” “incorporation of the social,” “Rule of Law II,” “post Moment,” and the development
of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework as all reflective of a shared
understanding that law and development thought has entered the Third Moment).
270
Id. at 8.
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vagueness, a priori, of Third Moment prescriptions is not unique to law
and development; rather it is a trait common to institutional approaches. In
an earlier paper I explored, with regard to a particular development
challenge, economic institutionalism’s openness to a range of alternative
policy options.271 A central element of new institutional approaches
important in my earlier exploration and important here is what Professor
Elinor Ostrom observed in her seminal work on the commons, namely that
“many solutions exist to cope with many different problems.”272
Though not a complete list, some solutions to a few of the problems
presented by remittances are suggested by the nature of the hardships
transnational families face. Countries such as the United States that rely
on immigrants can and should change the background rules in ways that
will close the distance between transnational family members.
Normalizing the status of immigrants could allow remittance-sending
immigrants to return to their homelands and their family members more
frequently, without risking the possibility they may not be able to return to
the United States. Directing U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(U.S.C.I.S.) to speed up their review of immigrant petitions, and providing
U.S.C.I.S. with additional funding to hire more employees, could help
reunite citizens with distant family members seeking to move to the United
States.273 Changing policies and norms to better incorporate immigrant
workers into mainstream employment could help ensure they receive onthe-job protections that U.S. citizens take for granted and enable
immigrants to better take advantage of work opportunities.274
Fundamentally, if the developed world is going to rely upon imported
labor, such remittance senders deserve acknowledgment as contributors to
their host country.
271

See Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your Land: Markets and Institutions for
Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245, 278–311 (2005) (discussing a
range of policy improvements suggested by New Institutional Economics (NIE) to the
underdevelopment found on Indian reservations). For more on institutional economics, see DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). A recent
law review note conducts a useful side-by-side analysis of Sen’s capacity approach and NIE, applied to
“Rule of Law” development rhetoric. Thom Ringer, Note, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law:
Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place in Development
Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 178, 200–07 (2007).
272
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 14 (1990).
273
Currently, naturalization applications “may take approximately 13–15 months to process.”
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Advisory on Processing Times, U.S.C.I.S. website,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=af2
37de128ce5110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=54519c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000
045f3d6a1RCRD) (last visited July 30, 2008).
274
Recent changes in immigration law have tended to have the opposite effect, making
immigrants less protected from unscrupulous employers. See Raquel E. Aldana, The Subordination
and Anti-Subordination Story of the U.S. Immigrant Experience in the 21st Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713,
720–22 (2007) (discussing the effect of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1996 on immigrant
worker protections).
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Solutions to the remittance-related challenges facing developing
countries are in some respects the opposite of those facing developed
countries: reducing their dependence on exporting labor.275 If developing
countries can provide those who are destined to emigrate with the tools or
resources they will need, such policies may be an appropriate form of
recognizing the transnational nature of their citizenry.276 But above all
else, developing countries must make it realistically possible for potential
emigrants to earn a decent living in their homeland. The circularity of such
a proposed “solution” is obvious: adequate growth will allow families to
stay intact and avoid the hardships that precede and run concurrently with
most remittance sending, but such a “solution” reads as mere avoidance,
defining away the problem. Yet there may be room for policies that
separate remittances from the national economy, at least for accounting
purposes. Doing so would help citizens better understand both the
strengths and weaknesses of their elected leaders (a fact likely to make a
full accounting of remittances difficult politically) and the side effects of
remittances. How to solve the development problem of remittancerecipient countries is perhaps the big unanswered question,277 but imposing
the tremendous costs of emigration and family separation on the populous
through economic policies that in practice require the exportation of a large
percentage of the population cannot be the development solution.
While some degree of indeterminacy is a natural element to a law and
development era that has moved beyond a simple one-size-fits-all
approach, indeterminacy does not foreclose the critique that a given
direction narrows the range of possibilities. Remittance advocates, by
taking advantage of the space between inclusive rhetoric and traditional
neoliberal market approaches, use the existing limits on converting socially
inclusive rhetoric into practice in a way that both elevates remittances
within the current institutional structure and risks reaffirming the more
traditional elements of those same institutions. To prevent such capture by
less repentant neoliberals, or by ideologically conservative members of the
275
Judge Posner’s concerns regarding foreign aid, that “[r]eceipt of money enables a government
to avoid grappling with the political, social, and economic conditions (cultures, institutions) that are
impeding economic development,” also apply to remittance dependence. Posting of Richard Posner to
Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/01/should_the_unit.html (Jan.
21, 2007, 22:36 EST).
276
One example is Mexico’s Matrícula Consular card, providing Mexican nationals with an
identity card for use in the United States. Secretaría de Relaciones Exterior de México, Certificado de
Matrícula Consular, available at http://www.sre.gob.mx/servicios/consulares/certificmatricula.htm; see
also Kathryn Lee Holloman, Note, Anti-Terrorism Banking Issues: The New Identity Crisis: USA
PATRIOT Act Customer Identification Programs and the Matricula Consular as Primary Identity
Verification for Mexican Nationals, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 125 (2003) (examining the implications of
the Patriot Act “on banks’ decisions to accept the Matricula Consular . . . as a primary form of
identification for purposes of opening a banking account”).
277
See, e.g., Hausmann & Rodrik, supra note 21 (exploring the mystery of El Salvador’s stagnant
growth even with seemingly strong economic policies).
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278

Third Moment of the remittance phenomenon, and to provide a direction,
if not a set prescription for future remittance work, it is best to focus once
more on understanding remittance flows.
C. Capturing Love
Remittances, collective and individual, are the most tangible
expression of the connection between migrants and their home country.
For El Salvador, remittances are “at the heart of claims about the
significance of the expatriate Salvadoran community . . . .”279 “Given the
size of the flows, the potential impact of these remittances on sending
countries’ economic development is significant. For this reason, sending
countries’ governments are increasingly involved in actively maintaining
ties to their expatriate communities.”280
Language, symbols, and programs all seek to maintain expatriate ties
to the Salvadoran community. A several story concrete welcome dedicated
to the hermano lejano who sits on the airport road; state-funded matching
funds for collective remittances;281 a separate newspaper section in La
Prensa Grafica dedicated to Salvadoran expatriate communities (the
section is entitled Departmento 15—a half-serious label that transforms the
United States into an additional region of El Salvador). All serve as a daily
reminder of the connection between the country and hermanos lejanos.282
Yet, Salvadorans seem to know that their country’s development and the
poverty in the country demands much more than what can be accomplished
through remittances alone.283
The U.S. government, by attempting to opportunistically characterize
remittances as official U.S. aid,284 has highlighted the danger inherent in
the capture of the remittance dialogue by developed countries, as well as
the problematic way in which a remittance emphasis might diminish calls
for more radical—meaning in this context more demanding of developed
countries—anti-poverty measures.285 As a Washington Post editorial
278
Though this sounds oxymoronic given the Third Moment’s emphasis on incorporation of the
social, what I mean by this is capture by conservatives who are comfortable manipulating the
intellectual tools of the Third Moment.
279
Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 187 (reporting on observations from their trip to
El Salvador).
280
Jones-Correa, supra note 194, at 1009.
281
Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 202.
282
Id.
283
Unfortunately, this is the perspective of an outsider looking in, based on conversations during
my many visits to El Salvador over the last five years.
284
Editorial, Counting Aid Dollars; A Half-Successful Attempt to Improve U.S. Standing, WASH.
POST, Apr. 16, 2006, at B06.
285
This arguably is already occurring. According to one law review article, “remittances benefit
the United States economy by taking the place of taxpayer dollars in the provision of foreign aid.”
Coffino, supra note 23, at 205–06; see also Torrisi, supra note 30, at 129–30 (using a decline in foreign
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argued, migrant remittances, while accounting for a large percentage of the
money flowing from the United States to developing countries, should not
be confused with development aid.286 Though some scholars have
“equat[ed] remittances with aid,”287 doing so diminishes the sacrifices of
transnational families288 and exaggerates the role of sending countries in
generating remittances.289 While immigration generally does reflect the
better opportunities available in developed countries, remittance sending is
a choice by migrants to send money to loved ones or to their communities,
and this choice is often made in the face of, rather than because of, policies
in sending countries.290 As 1974 Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal explained
more generally: “As the poverty in the underdeveloped countries cannot be
conjured away, the reader should expect in the field of aid a twist of the
statistics so as to show aid to be larger than it really is.”291 When
developed countries or their policy analysts inflate their aid figures using
remittance figures, the choices of individual migrants are conflated with
national foreign aid.292 Normally, foreign aid is determined by elected
representatives; the fallacy of treating remittances as aid can be seen by the
fact that remittance senders choose to spend more on personal consumption
in the United States, and this counts against U.S. aid figures.
Capture of the remittance phenomenon, obvious in the equating of aid
with remittances, can occur more subtly through the incorporation of
“remittances” into the government and non-profit bureaucracy of the
developed nations. The initial work done by remittance advocates has
been largely to inform policy makers and international bodies of the scope
of the remittance phenomenon. By asserting that the legal community
ought to pay attention to remittances as the economists have, this Article
fits at the tail end of that work. In moving beyond this initial period, it is
aid and simultaneous rise in remittances to argue that “remittances are de facto taking the place of
American foreign aid in stabilizing the government and social order of El Salvador”).
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crucial that remittance advocates and remittance receiving countries insist
upon a South-North perspective when looking at remittances. Remittances
are not uniquely a flow of money from developed Northern countries to
their Southern neighbors.293 Even when considering only money sent by
migrants to the United States, it is important to resist “obscuring the
relationship between the [migrant] and the place she left behind, as well as
the importance to her new country of that continuing relationship.”294
Remittances should matter to both remittance-sending and remittancereceiving countries, but are likely to matter more for the latter,295 and
therefore, the perspective of communities in such countries should be
heavily weighted. Long before the global institutions based in Washington
took an interest and before they reached the cover of The New York Times
Sunday Magazine, countries in Latin America have been aware of
remittances. In some ways the first stage of remittance research has been
about telling the North (and the international institutions headquartered in
developed countries) what the South already knew: migrants are sending a
lot of money home and remittances are important.
For Latino transnational families, remittances are but one aspect of a
complex cross-border relationship. For many migrants, the “Latin
American Dream” of making enough money to build a retirement home in
their home countries has replaced the “American Dream.” El Salvador,
through a program, “Vivienda Cercana,” created by El Fondo Socia para la
Vivienda, offers credit to Salvadorans living in the United States for use
towards the purchase of a house in El Salvador.296 Unlike the United
States, a country for which remittance outflows are a tiny fraction of the
national economy, there are tremendous incentives for recipient countries
to create remittance policies—including the development of remittancebased financial products—that facilitate rather than impede the goals of
transnational families linked through remittances. Whether through state
sponsored mortgage programs for migrants or through dual nationality
policies that seek “to foster ties between expatriates and countries of
origin” in the “hope these ties will pay off in terms of current remittances
293
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295
This can be seen in the difference in remittance awareness among the people of recipient
countries compared to that found among people in sending countries.
296
Lorena Baires, ¿Cómo Comprar una Casa en El Salvador?, EL SALVADOR.COM, Apr. 5, 2007,
available at http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=2968&idArt=925668#
(noting that legal residents pay a five percent down payment and undocumented Salvadorans in the
United States pay a fifteen percent down payment); see also Sana & Massey, supra note 43, at 510–11
(citations omitted) (“A common theme in the literature is that motivation to remit, at least partially, is
based on the expectation of inheriting land or other wealth, yielding the concept of ‘tempered altruism’
or ‘enlightened self-interest,’ which posits both altruism and individual gain as motivations to remit
when the migrant’s return is likely.”).

2008]

IMMIGRANT REMITTANCES

59

297

and future investments,” receiving countries are likely to be a more
reliable source of pro-poor, pro-development remittance policies than
sending countries.298
A South-North perspective cautions against regulatory roadblocks on
remittances. It is beyond the scope of this Article to critique U.S.
immigration policy or the current global limitations on the free flow of
labor;299 however, remittance policies must be developed in a way that
recognizes the rights of transnational families to express their love across
national borders. Love is perhaps the one true universal, and remittance
regulations or policies that stand in the way of this most basic of human
rights ought to be looked at and rejected. Immigration to the United States
is “a regular part of the life cycle for large numbers of men and women in
many parts of Latin America, [and] sending money back to relatives at
home has developed into a moral obligation.”300 The moral underpinnings
of remittance practices must be protected against regulatory practices or
taxes that raise the cost of sending money to loved ones.
A South-North perspective on remittances also cautions overly
optimistic accounts which would transform remittances into a “silver
bullet” for the developing world.301 Undoubtedly, part of the attraction to
remittances comes from its “bottom-up” aspect; that the South was aware
of remittances before the North seems to add to the credibility of
remittance driven proposals. Politicians have not yet devised programs
that take into account the dynamic nature of remittances, a fact strikingly
evident in the diplomatic context. As de luna Martinez states, “despite the
large amount of remittances developing countries receive every year, the
topic of remittances has not yet become an important public policy issue in
the bilateral agenda between governments in sending and recipient
countries.”302 Remittances are the international development community’s
new infatuation, seeming to offer a world of possibilities. As the newest
“new idea” to come up from the developing world, the reception of
297
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remittances mirrors the hype surrounding microcredit and land-titling.
Belief in the power of remittances comes as a natural product of the
larger distrust of “top-down” development and anti-poverty solutions, but
to understand remittances, their poverty alleviating aspects must be
decoupled from the idea that remittances are a route to development. For
those with an interest in the success of Latin America, remittances seem to
offer an escape from the policy requirements to which the region has been
subjected.303 Import-substitute industrialization followed by financial
austerity led to yet another top-down policy imposition of institutional
convergence, with little deviation allowed from the mono-institutionalism
of the North.304 By insisting on the primacy of the actions and possibilities
of the world’s poor, remittances appear to reverse the relative position of
the South regarding development priorities. Developing countries,
benefiting from the “transnational ties of [their] diasporas, especially their
concern for their homeland,”305 seem to have a greater ability to
independently direct their own growth.306
Unfortunately, remittances come with potential work disincentives,
price inflation, and limited, unproven effects on recipient-country national
development. Though they support the national income levels of many
countries with large remittance inflows, growth has been in single digits
for much of Latin America despite these inflows. Just as microcredit and
land-titling have not been the development solutions for countries with
decades of experience with those ideas, so, too, have remittances failed to
lead to sustained development. Remittances are worthy of our attention,
not as the path to development, but because of the important role they play
in alleviating poverty.
Remittances demand very little from the developed world and from
countries in the developing world, but we should demand more from
ourselves. Comfortable in the knowledge that the poor can help
themselves (albeit through personal sacrifice that affects entire families),
more radical proposals that highlight the need to expand international
obligations to the poor307 can be swept aside in favor of the politically
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possible.
Or if not swept aside, advocates of a more full recognition of
our shared humanity and the consequent expanded duty-of-rescue
requirements risk getting crowded out by the attention paid to “costless”
poverty solutions that rely on the poor to help themselves.309 The irony is
readily observed. Transnational families demonstrate, perhaps more than
most other relations, that people, in the words of Professor Jedediah Purdy,
“need one another to survive, to prosper, and to flourish.”310 The attention
economists have given remittances ought to be supplemented by attention
by legal academics and policy makers who are only now becoming aware
of remittances. But in doing so, care must be given that the dynamics of
remittances are not overstated. Much is at stake in remittance policy;
remittance-sending migrants are motivated primarily to make sure that the
family members they left home survive and perhaps prosper a little bit.
Global flourishing will require that the countries do more than not impede
the poor from entering the market; fundamentally, global flourishing
requires recognition that the poor should not be fighting by themselves
what should be our war on global poverty.311
V. CONCLUSION
Money sent by immigrants to their loved ones back home provides
food and basic necessities for their families and plays a significant role in
many Latin American economies.
The indifference of the legal
community to remittances is surprising, not only because the growth in
remittances over the last decade has captured the attention of the major
development institutions, but also because remittances potentially impact
many areas of law. Besides the more obvious fields of law and
308
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development and immigration law, remittances deserve consideration from
experts in trade law, business law, family law, international human rights
law, and tax law, to name a few.
In this Article I introduced remittances, presenting the anti-poverty
possibilities of these flows as well as the potential negative impacts of
remittances on recipient countries. How threats to remittances—from
undue regulatory burdens to overt taxation— are dealt with going forward
will determine whether the formalization and lower cost of remittance
transfers characteristic of the past decade continue.
These are important practical concerns, and ones that the paper
explored in detail, but the well-being of recipient families and recipient
countries in the long term will depend on how remittances fit into larger
law and development thinking. If remittances are called upon to assume
too many of the development responsibilities of “chastened neoliberalism,”
as the extent of their celebration by global institutions rightly or wrongly
suggests, remittances will undoubtedly fall short.

